This is a healthcare liability action involving the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to loss of consortium claims. The issue before the Court is whether the statutory cap on noneconomic damages applies separately to a spouse’s loss of consortium claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102, thus allowing each plaintiff to receive an award of up to $750,000 in noneconomic damages. Here, the surgery patient filed suit for noneconomic damages resulting from the defendant physicians’ negligence, namely that a portion of a Gelport device was unintentionally left in her body after surgery. In the same suit, the patient’s spouse claimed damages for loss of consortium. The jury awarded the patient $4,000,000 in damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. The jury also awarded her husband $500,000 in damages for loss of consortium. The trial court initially applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages by entering a judgment in favor of both plaintiffs collectively for a total judgment of $750,000. However, the trial court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend and applied the statutory cap to each plaintiff separately, thereby entering a judgment of $750,000 for the patient and $500,000 for her husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102 allows both plaintiffs to recover only $750,000 in the aggregate for noneconomic damages. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Tyrone E. Murphy, with one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of tampering with evidence in the death of Ashley Cates, the victim. The State proceeded solely on the count of first degree premeditated murder. The jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude post-mortem photographs of the victim and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Christopher Lynn Inman, was convicted by a jury of introduction of contraband into a penal facility and possession of marijuana. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by admitting the marijuana into evidence because the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Following our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Gilliam, of four counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The issue in this case is whether restrictive covenants executed and recorded by the developers of a subdivision after they had sold the parties’ lots apply to the Defendant’s property. The developers platted a subdivision and sold the vast majority of lots with timelimited restrictions against non-residential use expressly stated in the deeds that conveyed the lots. Thereafter, the developers recorded a declaration of more fulsome, non-timelimited restrictive covenants—including a restriction against non-residential use—that purported to apply to all lots in the subdivision. Decades later, well after the expiration of the time-limited deed restrictions, the Defendant purchased lots and proposed to build a structure for the operation of a retail business. The Plaintiffs, who reside in a home on lots adjacent to the Defendant’s property, brought a declaratory judgment action to enforce the non-time-limited restriction against non-residential use contained in the recorded declaration. The trial court enjoined the Defendant’s proposed commercial use, concluding that the Defendant’s property was—through the declaration—subject to an implied negative reciprocal easement that prohibited non-residential use. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the developers lacked the authority to impose the declaration’s restrictions upon the Defendant’s property because they did not own those lots when they executed and recorded the declaration. We further hold that the developers’ mere reacquisition and re-sale of some of the Defendant’s lots after the recording of the declaration did not retroactively restrict the Defendant’s property through the declaration. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Week of May 24, 2021 - May 28, 2021

Corrections are as follows:

Page 6, second paragraph originally read: "Mr. Darnell later positively identified the man behind the counter as Billy Wayne Voyles. He indicated the Defendant “looks like” the man he let go ahead of him through the night entrance door." It is revised to read: "Mr. Darnell later identified a photo of Billy Wayne Voyles as one of the men at the Memphis Inn that night. Mr. Darnell could not positively identify the Defendant’s photo from a photo lineup."

Page 25, the middle of the last paragraph originally read: "A witness described seeing someone who fit the Defendant’s description at the Memphis Inn with blood on his hands the night the victim disappeared. Another witness recalled seeing a maroon Honda parked close to the night entrance of the Memphis Inn around 1:40 a.m. and saw a man fitting the Defendant’s description place something heavy and wrapped in a blanket into the vehicle’s trunk." It is revised to read: "A witness described seeing a maroon Honda parked close to the night entrance of the Memphis Inn around 1:40 a.m. the night the victim disappeared, and saw a man place something heavy and wrapped in a blanket into the vehicle’s trunk."

Page 37, the second sentence of the fourth paragraph originally read: ". . .the Defendant had a significant record of violent crime, including armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and rape." It is revised to read: ". . .the Defendant had a significant record of violent crime, including assault with the intent to commit robbery with a deadly weapon, rape, and two counts of aggravated assault."

Thomas N. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“trial court”) terminating his parental rights to his minor child, Porcalyn N. (the “Child”). Discerning no error, we affirm.

QUESTION: Rule 24(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that alternate jurors “be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict.” However, Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to retain alternate jurors to substitute for regular jurors after deliberations have begun. Does a Tennessee criminal court judge have inherent authority, in a non-bifurcated trial, to follow the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the purposes of retaining alternate jurors after deliberations have started?

OPINION: No. Pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(f)(2), alternate jurors in a non-bifurcated trial must be dismissed once the jury retires to deliberate. Additionally, replacing a juror with an alternate juror after deliberations have begun may be structural constitutional error.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff The Keene Group, Inc. appeals the district court’s dismissal of its complaint against the City of Cincinnati, Ohio (“the City”) and several members of its Department of Buildings and Inspections. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the City’s demolition of a building as a public nuisance on property owned by Plaintiff. The complaint asserted causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for trespass under Ohio law. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. We AFFIRM.