KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, some sought to capitalize on consumers’ fear and uncertainty by charging outrageous prices for hand sanitizer, disinfecting wipes, masks, and other cleaning and protective products. In response, the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s Attorney General, Daniel J. Cameron, announced that his office would enforce the Commonwealth’s price-gouging laws against Kentucky businesses involved in such schemes. True to his word, the Attorney General opened civil price-gouging investigations into various Kentucky-based merchants, including at least one member of Plaintiff Online Merchants Guild (the “Guild”) that was selling goods to Kentuckians through Amazon’s online marketplace.

The Guild brought suit against Attorney General Cameron to challenge the constitutionality of Kentucky’s price-gouging laws as applied to sellers on Amazon, invoking, among other things, the extraterritoriality doctrine of the dormant commerce clause. Accepting that the Attorney General sought only to enforce the Commonwealth’s price-gouging laws against Kentucky-based sellers in connection with sales to Kentucky consumers through Amazon’s platform, the district court nevertheless granted the Guild’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that enforcing the laws in connection with Amazon sales would have impermissible extraterritorial effects. Because we conclude that the Attorney General’s enforcement of Kentucky’s price-gouging laws in this fashion is unlikely to run afoul of the dormant commerce clause’s extraterritoriality doctrine, we VACATE the preliminary injunction and REMAND for further proceedings.

Tommy Taylor, Defendant, was sentenced in Case No. RD 10835 to one year in split confinement followed by service of the balance of the sentence on community corrections. Defendant violated the rules of the institution where he was confined by being involved in two violent incidents with another inmate and one violent incident with a guard. The State moved to revoke Defendant’s community corrections sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered Defendant to serve his original sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Devaunte Stewart, pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary, one count of theft, and one count of disorderly conduct, and he received a split confinement sentence of three years, with the first six months to be served in confinement and the remaining time to be served on probation. A probation violation warrant was issued, and following a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court lacked substantial evidence to find that he violated his probation and that the trial court violated his due process rights by relying on a ground of which the probation revocation warrant gave no notice. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Aaron Evan Perry, was convicted by a jury of three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card of an amount of $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105(a)(1), -118(b). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to time served. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that a Belk department store loss prevention manager acted as an agent of the State when he seized the Defendant’s identification card and credit card, that the police conducted a pretextual traffic stop of the Defendant to investigate the Belk incident, and that the warrantless search of his vehicle was not justified as a search incident to arrest or inventory search; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred by admitting information generated by a hand-held credit card scanner without an adequate foundation; and (4) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of illegal possession of a credit card instead of fraudulent use of a credit card. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions and that reversible error occurred when the trial court mistakenly instructed the jury on the elements of illegal possession of a credit card. As a result, we remand the case for the entry of amended judgments reflecting the new conviction offenses of attempted theft, a Class B misdemeanor. In addition, in the interest of judicial economy, we modify the sentence in each count to reflect concurrent sentences of six months and apply to the Defendant’s two years of jail credit to satisfy his sentences.

The Defendant, Cynthia P. Nance, pled guilty to criminal simulation, theft of property valued over $2,500, three counts of identity theft, and passing a worthless check in an amount over $1,000, and she received an effective sentence of four years’ imprisonment. On appeal, she challenges the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence, arguing in particular that she should have received a sentence through the community corrections program. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not conducting an analysis under the community corrections statute when the Defendant never raised the issue and that the trial court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence. Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.

The Appellant, Derrick Jefferson, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to enter the Appellant’s prior mug shots into evidence; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to admit photographs of the victim’s body and the bullets taken from the victim’s body during the autopsy; (3) the trial court gave an erroneous oral jury instruction regarding the presumption of innocence; (4) the trial court gave an erroneous oral jury instruction that the stipulation regarding the Appellant’s mug shot, which revealed the Appellant’s prior arrests, was relevant only on the issue of the Appellant’s appearance; (5) the trial court erred by denying the Appellant’s request for a mistrial when, during voir dire, the jury pool entered the courtroom before the Appellant came out of “lockup”; (6) the cumulative errors require reversal of the Appellant’s conviction and a new trial. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Thomas Givan, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of first degree felony murder, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. One of the aggravated assault charges was dismissed, and a jury found Defendant guilty as charged on the remaining counts. Defendant received an effective sentence of life in prison. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal and argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Carlos Dewatherdo Ferguson, Jr., appeals his Hardin County Circuit Court jury convictions of second degree murder and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the State’s duty to preserve evidence; and the trial court erred by imposing a mid-range sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lynn Frank Bristol, Defendant, was indicted by the Coffee County Grand Jury for “sexual battery and rape of a child” for incidents involving his step-daughter. Nearly three years later, and three days prior to trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to reflect a charge of aggravated sexual battery in Count One and to amend the dates encompassed in the indictment in both Count One and Count Two. Defendant objected to the amendment and asked for a continuance. The trial court allowed the State to amend the indictment and denied a continuance. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery in Count One and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in Count Two. Defendant was sentenced to ten years for each conviction and the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years to be served at 100 percent. Defendant appeals, arguing: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment; (2) that the trial court erred by denying a continuance; (3) that the trial court improperly relied on State v. Qualls, 482 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2016), for a variety of reasons, including failing to give an enhanced unanimity instruction; (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; and (5) that the sentence is excessive. Because we determine that the trial court erred by failing to submit the complete written charge to the jury, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(c), the judgments of the trial court are reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Tyrone Bohanna, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, aggravated burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 120 years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Tyrone Bohanna, No. W2011-01273-CCA-R3- CD, 2013 WL 2393050, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 29, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective at trial and during proceedings on his motion for new trial, that the State failed to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that the Petitioner did not receive a fair trial after his trial was severed from the trial of his co-defendant. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.