Javier Alexander Rivas (“Defendant Rivas”) and Hayden S. Fryer (“Defendant Fryer”) (or collectively “the Defendants”) were each convicted by a Davidson County jury for first degree felony murder, first degree premediated murder, attempted aggravated burglary, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, burglary of an automobile, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of attempted first degree murder, for which the trial court sentenced both Defendant Rivas and Defendant Fryer to a total effective sentence of life plus fifty-two years. On appeal, Defendant Rivas argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of offenses; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Fryer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted aggravated burglary. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Adam Moates, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Lafaris Brown, was charged in two separate indictments with one count each of unlawful possession of a firearm and criminal gang offense enhancement. Case No. 114910, offense date January 6, 2019, was tried by jury on September 16, 2019, and Case No. 115023, offense date October 24, 2018, was tried in a bench trial on October 17, 2019. In both cases, which are consolidated on appeal, Defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. He was acquitted of the criminal gang offense enhancement count in Case No. 114910, and the trial court dismissed the criminal gang offense enhancement count in Case No. 115023. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) in Case No. 115023, that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress; (2) in Case No. 114910, (a) that the trial court erred by denying a jury instruction on a necessity defense, and (b) improper prosecutorial argument; and (3) in both cases, that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in Case No. 11490; however, we determine that, in Case No. 115023, law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Thus, we reverse the judgment of conviction in Case No. 115023.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. She challenges the trial court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Week of April 19, 2021 - April 23, 2021

Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-111 provides that when an insured property owner’s home or other structure sustains more than $1,000 in damages, the property or casualty insurance company shall name the general contractor of an uncompleted construction contract as a payee when issuing payment to the owner for the loss. Here, an insurance company issued a check to the insured owner but did not name the general contractor as a payee. The general contractor sued the insurance company, alleging noncompliance with section 56-7-111. We accepted three certified questions of law from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, one of which requires us to determine whether a general contractor has a private right of action against an insurance company for violating section 56-7-111. We hold that section 56-7-111 does not expressly grant a private right of action to the general contractor, and the general contractor failed to prove that the legislature intended to imply a private right of action. Thus, the general contractor has no right to sue the insurance company for noncompliance with section 56-7-111.

Appellants have filed a motion to stay the district court’s judgment and injunction pending appeal. Appellants have also filed a motion for expedited consideration of the motion to stay. Appellees oppose both motions. A majority of judges of this court having voted in favor of the motions,

It is ORDERED that the motion for expedited consideration is GRANTED.

It is further ORDERED that the motion to stay the district court’s judgment and injunction pending appeal is GRANTED, and that our prior opinion to the contrary, 988 F.3d 329, is VACATED.

The Petitioner, Jarod Marges Phillips, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because his claim was based on a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court that established a new rule of constitutional law. Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Javarius Deshawn Baugh, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first-degree premeditated murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a residual beneficiary’s objection to an estate administrator receiving any fees based upon the latter’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. David Ramey (“Ramey”) is a beneficiary under his late father’s will. However, Ramey was in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy at the time of his father’s death, and Ramey’s inheritance became part of the bankruptcy estate. Dustin Crouse (“Crouse”) was appointed administrator of the probate estate. Michael Fitzpatrick (“Fitzpatrick”) is the Chapter 7 Trustee. Ramey filed an objection alleging Crouse breached his fiduciary duty by selling the estate’s primary asset, a house, below market value in a private sale. The General Sessions Court for Loudon County, Probate Division (“the Trial Court”) ruled against Ramey, although it found he had standing to bring his claims. Ramey appeals, objecting to fees paid to Crouse. We hold that Ramey lacks standing as any such claims of his to the probate estate belong to the Chapter 7 Trustee rather than him. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court, although on different grounds. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed as modified.