A jury convicted the Defendant, Colton Davon Hatchett, of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine and the delivery of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender for each conviction, merged the convictions, and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence consecutively to his sentence for a prior conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Charles Griffin, of first degree felony murder for a shooting committed during the course of a robbery. The Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of first degree felony murder, that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce as evidence a photograph of the victim taken during the victim’s lifetime, and that the court erred in denying his motion for DNA testing and a continuance. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Pearson appeals the decision of the Court of Workers’ Compensation declining to award him benefits for a spinal cord injury allegedly sustained during the course and scope of his employment. The trial court held that Mr. Pearson’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and, alternatively, that he had failed to prove that his job installing streetlights was the actual and proximate cause of his injury. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because we conclude that Mr. Pearson filed his petition more than one year after he discovered his injury, the statute of limitations bars his claim. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. The question before us is whether a bump stock may be properly classified as a machine gun as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). But this case rests as much on who determines the statute’s meaning as it does on what the statute means.

On December 26, 2018, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF” or “Agency”) promulgated a rule that classified bump stocks as machine guns, reversing its previous position. See Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,514 (Dec. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pts. 447, 478, 479) (“Final Rule”). Plaintiffs-Appellants—three gun-rights organizations, two individuals who own bump stocks, and one individual who would purchase a bump stock if not for the Final Rule—filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Final Rule from taking effect. After finding that the ATF’s interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference, the district court held that the Final Rule’s classification of bump stocks as machine guns was “a permissible interpretation” of § 5845(b). Accordingly, the court concluded that Plaintiffs-Appellants were unlikely to succeed on the merits and denied the preliminary injunction.

Because an agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute is not entitled to Chevron deference and because the ATF’s Final Rule is not the best interpretation of § 5845(b), we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The husband in this divorce case failed to answer the wife’s complaint for legal separation or her amended complaint for divorce. The trial court awarded the wife a divorce, entered a permanent parenting plan, and divided the marital estate. The husband moved to set aside the judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. The husband appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

A former county commissioner appeals the trial court’s decision finding him liable for defamatory statements made about a private individual during a county legislative meeting. Following a thorough review of the record, we reverse.

In this termination of parental rights case, the child was placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) because the child’s parents were incarcerated. The mother’s parental rights were later terminated based upon the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence regarding two statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Appellants, purchasers of a residential property, filed an action against Appellees, sellers and owners of the residential construction company that built the subject property, for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”) and intentional misrepresentation for failure to disclose water damage and substandard repairs to the property. Appellants also sued a termite inspection company for negligently failing to disclose termite damage to the property. Appellants settled with the termite company for $45,000.00 but proceeded to trial against Appellees. Although the trial court found that Appellees intentionally misrepresented the condition of the property to Appellants, it found that Appellants were not “consumers” under the TCPA, and that the Act did not apply to this real estate transaction. The trial court awarded Appellants a $43,811.00 judgment against Appellees, for intentionally failing to disclose the water damage to the property, but found that Appellants had been fully compensated for their loss from the settlement with the termite company. As such, Appellants were not entitled to further compensatory damages from Appellees. We conclude the trial court erred in finding that Appellants were not consumers under the Act and that the TCPA was not applicable to this real estate transaction. We remand for a determination of whether Appellees violated the Act, and, if so, whether Appellants are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and treble damages. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. This case involves two unsolicited fax advertisements received by Brian Lyngaas, D.D.S., in March 2016. Lyngaas asserts, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated class members, that Curaden AG and its U.S. subsidiary, Curaden USA, violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, by sending the advertisements.

Both Lyngaas and Curaden USA appeal the judgment of the district court, and both Lyngaas and Curaden AG cross-appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

The Petitioner, Colin D. Savage, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.