This Court suspended an attorney from practicing law for six months, with one month on active suspension. The discipline resulted from a report of misconduct received by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility in 2013. In 2018, we reinstated the attorney to the practice of law based on his eligibility for reinstatement and his compliance with the order of discipline. Before being reinstated, the attorney agreed to a monthly payment plan to satisfy the Board’s assessed costs from the disciplinary case. Soon after he was reinstated, the attorney petitioned the Board to revoke the agreed costs. The attorney argued he did not owe the costs because the Board improperly assessed costs under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 in effect when the 2013 disciplinary proceeding was initiated instead of Rule 9 in effect when he was reinstated. A hearing panel found the Board had properly assessed costs based on Rule 9 in effect when the disciplinary proceeding began. The attorney appealed. We affirm. Based on this Court’s Order promulgating revised Rule 9 and our subsequent decisions, the version of Rule 9 that was in effect when the disciplinary case was initiated in 2013 governs the assessment of costs regardless of when this Court reinstated the attorney to the practice of law. Thus, we hold the Board followed the correct procedure in assessing costs. We order the attorney to pay the costs assessed against him within forty-five days of the filing of this opinion. Failure to timely pay the costs may serve as a ground for revocation of the attorney’s reinstatement to practice law.

Defendant-Appellant, Morris Long, was convicted by a Dickson County jury of firstdegree premeditated murder, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Week of March 1, 2021 - March 5, 2021

This case involves the appeal of an order granting but reducing an attorneys’ fee sought by the attorneys for the surviving spouse of a deceased employee. The underlying claim for death benefits was resolved, but the employer declined to pay the attorneys’ fee sought by the surviving spouse’s attorneys in a lump sum. The employer also objected to the extent of the fee, arguing it was unreasonable under the circumstances of the case. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded an attorneys’ fee but reduced it from the amount sought, 20% of the difference between the recovery achieved in Tennessee versus the recovery being paid under the laws of another state, to 7.5% of the additional recovery. The surviving spouse has appealed. Because we conclude the trial court did not address the applicability of certain statutory language governing the approval of attorneys’ fees, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for further consideration.

A Macon County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Jeffery Dewayne Strong, of selling a Schedule III, controlled substance, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to play an audio recording of the controlled drug buy. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the Appellant waived the issue regarding the audio recording because he failed to raise it in his motion for a new trial or at the hearing on the motion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Edward Seaton, was convicted of facilitation of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class E felony, and one count each of vandalism, evading arrest, and driving with a revoked license, second offense, Class A misdemeanors. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-403, -14-103, -14-105, - 14-408, -16-603, 55-50-504. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial when a court officer, who was acting as jury custodian, was called and sworn as a rebuttal witness; (2) that the court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after the court elicited from a defense witness the name of the witness’s father-in-law, who was “a notorious criminal and murderer”; (3) that the court erred by admitting reputation or opinion evidence from three law enforcement officers regarding a defense witness’s character for truthfulness; (4) that plain error occurred when the State cross-examined a defense witness regarding prior criminal behavior not resulting in a conviction; and (5) that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Following our review, we conclude that the admission of reputation and opinion evidence from law enforcement officers constitutes reversible error such that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial. Alternatively, we conclude that the Defendant would be entitled to relief due to cumulative error.

The Defendant, Craig Rickard, was convicted by a Cheatham County Circuit Court jury of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced pursuant to a pleabargained sentencing agreement to an effective term of twenty-five years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by admitting the video recordings of the victim’s forensic interviews, in not conducting a jury out hearing to determine the victim’s qualifications as a witness, and by suggesting to the prosecutor the manner in which a question could be posed in order to avoid the Defendant’s hearsay objection. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Delmar L. Mack, Jr., appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because, at the time he entered his plea agreement, he was suffering from “severe mental distress and anxiety,” resulting in an inability to understand the nature and details of the agreement. Following a thorough review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Michelle Bennington, filed a pro se motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to correct an alleged clerical error in a July 22, 2019 probation revocation order. The motion sought entry of a corrected order providing 827 days of postjudgment jail credit. The trial court determined that there was no clerical error in the revocation order and denied the motion. However, the trial court determined that there was a clerical error in the May 23, 2016 judgments of conviction and entered corrected judgments providing two additional days of pretrial jail credit. Finding no error, we affirm.

After purchasing an automobile from the defendant, the plaintiff brought suit in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County, alleging fraud and deception. The defendant filed a counterclaim for breach of contract. The general sessions court dismissed both parties’ claims and the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. The case was dormant for nearly six months. Eventually, the plaintiff moved to set a trial date with the circuit court. In response, the defendant moved to dismiss the case under Rule 20(b) of the Davidson County Local Rules of Court. The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff’s subsequent motion to set aside. The plaintiff appealed. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to set aside and remand.