The defendant, Michael E. White, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original nine-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation by imposing the original sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The State appeals the trial court’s imposition of a community corrections sentence, arguing the defendant did not qualify for alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we find the trial court erred in not considering all the applicable factors. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Michael Ray Perna, pleaded guilty to a Class E felony violation of the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(d)(1)(A) Sex Offender Registry Act. At sentencing, the Defendant argued that he was acting as the minor victim’s legal guardian pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section (d)(2)(D) and thus was only eligible for a fine by way of punishment, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(g)(4). The trial court rejected the Defendant’s argument and imposed a two-year sentence, suspended to probation after ninety days in jail. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Brian Howard, Defendant, was indicted for one count of second degree murder, one count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. A co-defendant, Quinton Brown, was also indicted for his role in the offenses and the two were tried together. Defendant asked the trial court to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count prior to trial. The trial court denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter as well as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony as charged in the indictment. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 67 years, to be served consecutively to a fifteen-year federal sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals to this Court arguing that the trial court erred by denying the motion to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions where the proof indicated that Defendant acted in self-defense. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter for correction of the judgment form in Count 4 to reflect that the conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a felony is a class C felony.

On July 12, 2019, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Collier, entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt aggravated sexual battery and indecent exposure, for which he received an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, all of which was to be served on supervised probation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-504 (2019). As part of his sentence, the Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender and placed on community supervision for life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-524 (2014). Within three months, on October 15, 2019, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s supervised probation based on a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39- 211(d)(1)(B) (2019), which restricts movement of violent sex offenders, and ordered the Defendant to serve the original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals the order of the trial court arguing that subsection (d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because certain terms including “playground,” “any other specific or legitimate reason,” “stand,” “sit idly,” and “remain” are not defined and “ambiguous.” He additionally argues that subsection (d)(1)(B) is overbroad in violation of his First Amendment rights because (1) it applies to all sex offenders even if the offense did not involve a child victim; and (2) the term “playground” can include a church, an offender’s front yard, and places where other adults are present.1 Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this healthcare liability action, Appellant/patient appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee/hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment based, inter alia, on its conclusion that Appellant failed to provide evidence that Appellee’s immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act is waived due to some action/inaction of its employee. Affirmed and remanded.

This suit involves an injury sustained by a minor at a track and field tryout at the middle school he attended. The minor’s mother brought suit individually and on behalf of her minor child against the county school system and the school board for the minor’s injuries and subsequent medical expenses. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $200,000 in compensatory damages. The defendants appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decisions and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Chancery Court for Henderson County terminated the parental rights of a mother to two minor children based upon two statutory grounds: persistence of conditions and a ten-year prison sentence while the children were under the age of eight years old. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground of persistence of conditions was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm, however, the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence supports termination of the mother’s parental rights based upon her current prison sentence. We also affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the best interests of both children.

This appeal arises from a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner, Jabari Issa Mandela a/k/a John Wooden (“Petitioner”), seeking relief pursuant not only to a writ of certiorari but also including in his petition an action seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to an alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Following the respondents’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) and (6) and Petitioner’s response thereto, the Trial Court dismissed Petitioners’ original civil rights cause of action, filed pursuant to section 1983, due to its impermissible joinder with an appellate cause of action. The Trial Court further granted the motion to dismiss as to the writ of certiorari, in part, because Petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Because Petitioner has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 by not presenting an argument concerning whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his petition for writ of certiorari, he has waived this issue on appeal. As such, the Trial Court’s dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Petitioner also raises an issue concerning the amount of filing fees he was required to pay by the Trial Court to initiate the current action. On remand, the Trial Court shall revisit its order regarding the amount of filing fees to determine compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-21-401.

A homeowner in a subdivision sued the construction company that developed the subdivision and the president of the company for damages, claiming that the subdivision was a “failed development” because only five out of thirty-one lots were developed before construction ceased and promised amenities, including a club house and swimming pool, were never built. The homeowner obtained default judgments for liability and money damages against the company and a default judgment for liability against the company president. During the trial to determine damages against the company president, the homeowner orally stated his intent to nonsuit his claim for damages while retaining the default judgment for liability. The trial court entered an order nonsuiting the homeowner’s entire claim against the company president. The homeowner appeals, claiming the right to a partial nonsuit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.