In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1- 102(1)(A)(ii); (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); (3) persistence of conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); and (4) mental incompetence, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) creates an insurance program to protect employees’ pension benefits. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”)—a wholly-owned corporation of the United States government—is charged with administering the pension-insurance program.

In this case, PBGC terminated the “Salaried Plan,” a defined-benefit plan sponsored by Delphi Corporation. The termination was executed through an agreement between PBGC and Delphi pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c). The appellants—retirees affected by termination of the Salaried Plan—bring several challenges to the termination. First, the retirees argue that section 1342(c) requires a judicial adjudication before a pension plan may be terminated. Second, the retirees contend that termination of the plan violated their due process rights. Third, the retirees assert that PBGC’s decision to terminate the Salaried Plan was arbitrary and capricious.

But the retirees’ arguments do not require reversal. First, subsection 1342(c) permits termination of distressed pension plans by agreement between PBGC and the plan administrator without court adjudication. Second, the retirees have not demonstrated that they have a property interest in the full amount of their vested, but unfunded, pension benefits. Third, PBGC’s decision to terminate the Salaried Plan was not arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.

The employee had four fingers of his right hand accidentally amputated when he reached past the guard on a fabric-cutting machine to remove fabric that had clogged the machine. The employer denied the employee’s claim for benefits, asserting no compensation was due because of the employee’s willful violation of the employer’s safety rules. Following a trial, the court found the employer instituted and enforced safety rules, the employee was aware of and willfully violated the rules, and the employee did not have a valid excuse for violating the rules. The court denied the employee’s claim, and the employee has appealed. We conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s decision, and we affirm and certify as final the trial court’s compensation order denying benefits.

Week of December 21, 2020 - December 23, 2020

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. For nearly twenty years, our circuit has held that a drug-trafficking conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841 does not require proof that the defendant knew the type or quantity of controlled substance involved in the offense. See United States v. Hamm, 952 F.3d 728, 739 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550, 569–71 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Garcia, 252 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2001). In this appeal, the sole issue is whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), abrogated our precedent. We hold that it did not.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This is Defendant Michael Jerome Henry’s third time before the court. On this occasion, Henry appeals the district court’s order finding that First Step Act § 403 did not apply to his resentencing. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we REVERSE the district court’s order holding the First Step Act is not applicable to Henry and REMAND for resentencing in accordance with First Step Act § 403.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lynne Donovan appeals from a judgment entered against her after the district court granted Defendant FirstCredit, Inc.’s (“FirstCredit”) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The central issue is whether Donovan’s allegations—concerning a letter that FirstCredit sent to Donovan regarding a purported medical debt—are sufficient to state a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8), a provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) that limits the language and symbols that debt collectors may employ on an envelope when communicating with a consumer by mail. The district court determined that FirstCredit’s letter did not run afoul of § 1692f(8) and accordingly granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of FirstCredit. We disagree, and so we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

Margle Otis Ward, Defendant, admitted to violating the conditions of his probation. The trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered the execution of the judgments as originally entered. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by fully revoking his probation “without considering alternative sanctions or tailoring a sanction to address Defendant’s drug use.” We determine that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in both revoking probation and in ordering the execution of the judgments as originally entered.

Appellee purchased real property at foreclosure and filed this forcible entry and detainer action seeking possession. Appellee received a judgment for possession in the general sessions court, and Appellant, the former owner of the property, petitioned for de novo review in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment; Appellant filed no response to the motion and no countervailing statement of undisputed material facts. On the undisputed facts, Appellee is the bona fide purchaser for value of the property and has good title pursuant to the “Substitute Trustee’s Deed.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, granting it immediate possession of the Property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. The father argues that the trial court erred in finding that he committed severe child abuse and in finding termination to be in the child’s best interest. He asserts that there was no evidence that he knew or should have known about the child’s injuries. In light of all of the facts, including the nature of the child’s injuries, the medical evidence, and the trial court’s finding concerning the father’s credibility, we conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights.