This appeal concerns injuries allegedly caused by dogs running loose and the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413. Under this statute, the “owner of a dog has a duty to keep that dog under reasonable control at all times, and to keep that dog from running at large.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-413(a)(1). “A person who breaches that duty is subject to civil liability for any damages suffered by a person who is injured by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in or on the private property of another.” Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee/Defendant, an LLC, where the dogs had been kept prior to the incident, as to an alleged violation of section 44-8-413, holding that the Appellee/Defendant never assumed ownership of the dogs at the center of this dispute. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on this issue.

This case involves an unwed father’s right to visitation with his minor child. After an initial denial of Father’s request for visitation, the trial court later granted Father and Father’s mother visitation rights following the filing of a Rule 60 motion. In granting relief, the trial court found that Father had standing, having previously executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Mother filed a timely appeal arguing that the trial court erred in granting Father relief. Notably, Mother contested Father’s standing to sue for visitation, arguing that the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity did not vest Father with standing to sue. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s order granting Father relief. Further, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order granting visitation rights to Father’s mother.

An employee sustained severe injuries when she was run over by a public transit bus on her way to work. The employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, and she filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission. Both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the employee was within the course and scope of her employment when the injury occurred. The Claims Commission answered the question in the negative and determined that the case was subject to the “coming and going” rule. Therefore, the Claims Commission granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Upon our review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

This appeal involves the termination of both parents’ rights to one of their minor children. Following a trial, the Bradley County Juvenile Court found that petitioners proved two statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Both parents appealed, arguing the abandonment was not willful. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm.

COLE, Chief Judge. After filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Kathryn MacEwen Conti commenced an adversary proceeding against Arrowood Indemnity Co. seeking to determine that loans she incurred while enrolled at the University of Michigan were not “qualified education loan[s]” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) and were thus dischargeable in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Arrowood, concluding that the plain language of the loan documents demonstrated they were qualified education loans. Because the bankruptcy court’s conclusion was correct, we affirm its summary judgment in favor of Arrowood.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Beginning in 2003, Leslie Clabo had several procedures performed to correct certain painful and uncomfortable medical issues. To alleviate her suffering, Clabo was implanted with a TVT transvaginal mesh device that was manufactured by Defendants-Appellees, Johnson & Johnson Health Care Systems, Inc. and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (collectively, “the Defendants”). Over time, Clabo was forced to repair and replace the mesh product because it eroded and would intermittently not serve its intended purpose. After Clabo initiated a products liability lawsuit, in which she alleged that the Defendants were liable for her injuries under Tennessee law, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Clabo’s claims were time-barred in accordance with Tennessee’s statute of repose. When Clabo subsequently filed a motion to amend her complaint and add new claims related to her injuries, the Defendants argued that her motion was futile because all of her claims were time-barred. The district court ultimately agreed with the Defendants, granted their motion for summary judgment, and denied Clabo’s motion to amend her complaint. On appeal, Clabo’s primary contention is that the district court erred in determining her date of injury. Because the record undoubtedly demonstrates that Clabo’s injuries occurred outside of the applicable statute of repose period, we AFFIRM the district court. I

A Giles County jury convicted the Petitioner, Cody D. Marks, of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public park, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to fifteen years of incarceration, twelve years of which was to be served at 100%. This court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Cody D. Marks, No. M2018-00020-CCA-R-CD, 2018 WL 6992553, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 13, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2019). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Husband appeals the trial court’s decisions regarding the classification and division of property relative to divorce. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

Appellant appeals the circuit court’s decision to allow a law firm to intervene in an estate matter. Because we conclude that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this estate matter, we vacate the decision of the circuit court and remand with instructions to transfer this matter back to probate court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by M.E. Buck Dougherty, III (“Petitioner” or “Father”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case involving modification of a parenting plan. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding that the Chancery Court for Fayette County (“the Trial Court”) properly recused but erred in entering further orders, we vacate, in part, the November 5, 2020 order and affirm the order as so modified.