In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental right to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(2); and (3) failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit and support. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(2); (2) mental incompetence, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the children, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(14). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We reverse the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

This appeal arises out of a dispute concerning an express, ingress and egress easement across the defendant’s property. The principal issue is whether the plaintiff abandoned the easement by failing to maintain the easement in a condition permitting it to be used for access and/or by acquiescing in the acts of others that reduced the utility of the easement. Following a bench trial, the court determined the defendant failed to prove abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Having determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings by the trial court, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Lajuan Harbison, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his conviction for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate and assert a claim of self-defense. Relative to the error coram nobis petition, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that new evidence from the victim, who recanted his trial testimony and averred that he was the primary aggressor rather than the Petitioner, was not credible. Following our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Carl R. Greene, was convicted upon his guilty plea of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39- 14-103(a) (2018); 39-14-105(a)(5) (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft). The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range I offender, to split confinement consisting of one year in jail followed by eight years on community corrections. The court ordered the Defendant to pay restitution of $83,457.60. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred by imposing a nine-year, split confinement sentence and by failing to consider the Defendant’s ability to pay the restitution amount. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for resentencing.

This case involves an attempt by a former shareholder of a corporation to bring suit on behalf of the corporation on the basis of a contractual assignment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that there was no valid assignment of the corporation’s rights and that any individual claims asserted by the former shareholder were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The former shareholder appeals. We affirm.

The principal issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether intentional misrepresentations made by health care providers to induce a prospective patient to engage the health care providers’ services are within the purview of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101 to -122. The complaint filed by the patient, Donna Cooper (“Mrs. Cooper”), and her husband alleges that Dr. Mason Wesley Mandy (“Dr. Mandy”) and Rachelle Norris (“Ms. Norris”) with NuBody Concepts, LLC, intentionally misrepresented that Dr. Mandy was a board-certified plastic surgeon and, based on their misrepresentation, Mrs. Cooper gave Dr. Mandy her consent to perform the surgery. Following “painful, disastrous results,” the plaintiffs asserted four claims: (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) medical battery; (3) civil conspiracy; and (4) loss of consortium. Defendants filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the presuit notice and filing requirements of the Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding the Act did not apply. This interlocutory appeal followed. We hold that Mrs. Cooper is entitled to proceed on her claims of intentional misrepresentation and civil conspiracy because the alleged misrepresentations were inducements made prior to the existence of a patient-physician relationship; thus, the claims were not related to “the provision of . . . health care services.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101(a)(1). We also affirm its ruling on the medical battery claim because a physician’s misrepresentation of a material fact, if proven, may vitiate consent, and, without consent, the very act of touching Mrs. Cooper may constitute an unlawful and offensive act that is not related to the provision of health care services. See Holt v. Alexander, No. W2003-02541-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 94370, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005). Further, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on Mr. Cooper’s claim for loss of consortium because, as the trial court held, his claims relate to Dr. Mandy’s and Ms. Norris’s false representations of Dr. Mandy’s credentials, not to a provision of, or a failure to provide, a health care service. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. The district court sentenced Richard Mukes to a term of 120 months’ imprisonment after he pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mukes appeals his sentence because he believes that the district court improperly calculated his sentencing guidelines range. Specifically, he argues that the district court erred in applying a four-point enhancement for using or possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), and in applying a two-point enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight, § 3C1.2. Mukes further contends that the district court erred in denying him a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, § 3E1.1. Because the government failed to demonstrate that either enhancement was applicable on this record, the district court erred in applying them. We therefore vacate Mukes’s sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing on the existing record with instructions not to apply either enhancement. In light of our decision on the enhancements, the district court should consider whether Mukes may receive the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

The petitioner, Marvin Christopher Long, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine in a drug-free school zone and conspiracy to commit the same, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.