THAPAR, Circuit Judge. James Pogue believed that he had a severe anxiety disorder that prevented him from practicing as a family doctor. So he submitted a disability claim to his two long-term disability insurers: Northwestern Mutual and Principal Life Insurance Company.

When Pogue’s lawsuit against Principal reached summary judgment, the district court applied issue preclusion. The court relied on the Pogue I district court’s holding that the suspension of Pogue’s license contributed to his disability. The court held that this finding was fatal for Pogue’s breach-of-contract claim and granted summary judgment for Principal. In view of that ruling, the court did not address whether the suspension occurred before Pogue became disabled. The court also granted summary judgment for Principal on Pogue’s bad-faith claims.

On appeal, Pogue contends that the district court erred by giving preclusive effect to an alternative holding on which this court declined to opine. We agree and reverse.

SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Buck Ryan is a professor of journalism at the University of Kentucky. Following an audit, the University accused him of misusing department resources to make a larger profit off a textbook he had authored. He was asked to resign from his position as a tenured professor, but he refused to do so. Ryan brought suit against Defendants David Blackwell, Joseph Reed, Derek Lane, and Mike Farrell, alleging, amongst other things, that they retaliated against him for asserting his due process and First Amendment rights after he refused to resign. The district court dismissed Ryan’s claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On appeal, Ryan alleges that the district court misconstrued his complaint, that he plausibly alleged due process retaliation, and that his speech was on a matter of public concern. He argues that he did, therefore, meet the Rule 12(b)(6) requirements to plausibly state a claim Blackwell, Reed, Lane, and Farrell argue that even if they did violate Ryan’s rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Julius Ruffin pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a mixture of heroin and fentanyl, which he had hidden in his rectum. He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress those drugs, arguing that Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents did not show probable cause to obtain the warrant and that the manner of the search violated the Fourth Amendment. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

The defendant, Kendall Rivers, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of voluntary manslaughter, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a video recording taken from the defendant’s cellular telephone, by imposing the maximum sentence, and by ordering the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Jaron Harris, Petitioner, filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through counsel, claiming he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, due process, and equal protection based on the racial composition of the jury. The post-conviction court denied relief. Although Petitioner mentions ineffective assistance of counsel in his brief, the only issue raised on appeal is the stand-alone equal protection issue, citing the racial composition of the jury. Because Petitioner failed to raise the jury composition issue on direct appeal of his convictions and because Petitioner abandoned the other issues raised in his post-conviction petition, those issues are waived. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue in this appeal is whether the defendant waived the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction through insufficient service of process by making a general appearance. It is undisputed that service of process on the defendant was insufficient when this case commenced in the general sessions court. Nevertheless, the defendant’s counsel appeared on behalf of the defendant in the general sessions court, and the court set a trial date. Prior to a trial on the merits, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the civil warrant premised on insufficient service of process. The record does not include any ruling on that motion, and the general sessions court transferred the case to the circuit court by agreement of the parties before a trial on the merits. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed her second motion to dismiss the action based on insufficient service of process. The circuit court denied the motion ruling that, although service of process was insufficient, the defendant waived the issue by making a general appearance in general sessions court. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $35,667.42, and this appeal followed. In Tennessee, a party makes a general appearance for the purposes of waiver by seeking affirmative action from the court on an issue related to the merits of the dispute. See Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tenn. 1994); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-505 (any issues related to the general sessions court’s jurisdiction must be raised “before the hearing, or they will be considered as waived.”). There is nothing in the record indicating that the defendant sought affirmative action from the court on an issue related to the merits of the dispute in the general sessions court prior to filing her motion to dismiss. Further, the record shows that the defendant promptly filed another motion to dismiss on the same ground when the case was transferred to the circuit court. Therefore, the defendant did not waive the issue of insufficient service of process. Because it is undisputed that service of process was insufficient, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and this case is remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the action.

The employer challenges the trial court’s denial of its request for a medical evaluation to be performed by its doctor pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1). The employee, a roofer, fell from the roof of a house and sustained injuries to his thoracic spine, resulting in paralysis below the T-10 level. Upon reaching maximum medical improvement, the employee obtained a medical impairment rating from a physician in Tennessee before moving to Maryland. Thereafter, the employer asked the employee to submit to an evaluation in Tennessee with a doctor of its choice. The employee refused, claiming the request was unreasonable due to his physical condition, traveling obstacles, and COVID-19 considerations. Following the employee’s refusal to attend the examination, the employer filed a motion to compel the medical examination. The trial court denied the employer’s motion, concluding its request was not reasonable. We affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

This is a health care liability case. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E), arguing that the plaintiff had not provided them HIPAA compliant medical authorizations allowing them to receive medical records from the other providers being sent statutorily-required pre-suit notice. The trial court agreed with the defendants’ argument and, upon observing that the plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the 120-day extension of the statutory limitation period pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c), held that the complaint was time-barred and should be dismissed with prejudice. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Revada Wright, was convicted by a Bradley County Criminal Court jury of speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, and possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 gram of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2012) (subsequently amended) (possession of cocaine); 55-8-152 (2017) (speeding). He received a sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because there is insufficient evidence to support his drug conviction. We reverse the judgment for possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 gram of cocaine, vacate the Defendant’s conviction, and dismiss the charge.

The Defendant, Billy Ray Moats, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court convictions for two counts each of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient relative to the value of the stolen property in support of his theft convictions; in addition, he raises for the first time on appeal a challenge to the version of the theft grading statute applied during sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that although the evidence regarding the property’s value was sufficient, the trial court should have applied the amended theft grading statute that went into effect on January 1, 2017, and that plain error relief is warranted. We remand for the entry of corrected judgments in Counts 3 and 4 reflecting Class A misdemeanor convictions and a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to serve. The trial court’s merger of the convictions and its determination regarding consecutive sentencing will remain the same.