The Defendant, William Brian Robinson, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of seventeen years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his request to present evidence that the State had previously pursued two theories of guilt that were inconsistent with its theory at trial; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, specifically, challenging the mens rea element of knowing; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify about blood spatter evidence when that witness had not been qualified as an expert; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors requires a new trial.1 After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial on the charge of second degree murder, during which the Defendant shall be permitted to present evidence of the State’s previous theories of guilt.

The Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals as of right from the Giles County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his life sentence for his first degree felony murder was illegal because the statute governing his release eligibility does not allow for the possibility of parole. The Petitioner contends that the petition stated a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

JULIA S. GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Fourteen-year-old A.F. reported to police that she was being blackmailed by a user on the messaging application Kik. She explained that the perpetrator had obtained nude photographs from her phone and was threatening to release the images if she did not send additional nude photographs. Oakland County, Michigan, deputies investigated her claims but disregarded the fact that the blackmailer used the Kik username “anonymousfl” rather than “anonymous”—a separate Kik username associated with Johnny Tlapanco, a New York resident. As a result, New York Police Department (“NYPD”) officers working with Oakland County Deputy Jonathan Elges, searched Tlapanco’s apartment, seized his electronic devices, arrested him, and detained him in New York for two weeks before extraditing him to Michigan and detained him at the Oakland County jail for an additional three weeks before the charges were dismissed.

Tlapanco sued the deputies and Oakland County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that: (1) Elges unlawfully searched his apartment, caused his false arrest, and prosecuted him for offenses related to child pornography; (2) Deputy Michael McCabe unlawfully seized, searched, and copied his electronic devices prior to returning them to him; and (3) Oakland County is liable for failure to train or because of McCabe’s decisions as a purported county policymaker. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all appellees. Tlapanco challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Elges, McCabe, and Oakland County. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to McCabe and Oakland County, but reverse the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elges on Tlapanco’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution claims.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. What began as a case about defective blenders has devolved into a quarrel about attorney’s fees. In this appeal, we consider several questions of first impression about attorney’s fees in class-action settlements. We agree with the district court on many issues but find that it abused its discretion as to the final award of fees. We therefore vacate the award and remand for further proceedings.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. In June 2016, Brittan Kettles set out to build a prostitution “empire.” He then prostituted a thirteen-year-old child to at least six different men. A jury convicted Kettles of one count of sex trafficking a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c), and one count of conspiracy to do the same in violation of § 1594(c). Kettles now raises six challenges to his conviction on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. This is a tragic case in which a thirteen-year-old boy was struck by a truck while riding his bicycle to school after he missed his school bus. The boy’s parents, Timothy and Teresa Kocher (the Kochers), acting on behalf of their son, sued the bus company, Durham School Services, for negligence. Although a jury found Durham negligent, the jury also found the Kochers more than 50 percent responsible for the accident. Accordingly, Tennessee’s comparative negligence law barred the Kochers from recovering. The Kochers appealed, challenging the district court’s exclusion of evidence and expert testimony. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and DISMISS Durham’s cross appeal as moot.

The Appellant, Jeffrey Wayne Haithcote, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to two counts of selling heroin and one count of possessing heroin with intent to sell, Class B felonies. As a condition of his pleas, he reserved certified questions of law concerning whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the search of his residence because the affidavit underlying the search warrant did not establish probable cause. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

This is an appeal of a suit contesting the validity of a Last Will and Testament. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a dispute over vacation benefits. The plaintiffs allege that their employer deprived them of earned vacation time when it changed its vacation policy. The plaintiffs moved for class certification, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After hearing both motions, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice and denied the motion for class certification. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The sole issue in this appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to classify residential property as the wife’s separate asset. The trial court made its decision upon finding the wife purchased the property prior to the marriage, titled it in her name only, and paid the mortgage and expenses to maintain the property with money she earned during the marriage and with only occasional assistance from the husband. This appeal followed. The husband contends the property should have been classified as a marital asset because the couple resided there as husband and wife for ten years; the money the wife earned during the marriage was marital property; and he made substantial contributions to maintaining the property and paying expenses. We have determined that the funds the wife used to pay the mortgage and expenses were marital assets because they were earned during the marriage. Moreover, the couple used the property as their marital residence during their ten-year marriage, and the husband provided some, albeit modest, assistance in maintaining the property. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that the property shall be classified as a marital asset. Based on this decision, we vacate the division of the marital estate and remand for the trial court to determine the value of the marital assets, equitably divide those assets, and enter judgment accordingly. The husband also contends the trial court’s discovery sanction against the wife was insufficient. Finding no error with this discretionary decision, we affirm the sanction imposed by the trial court.