Defendant, Amanda Faye Layne, was convicted by a jury of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of the arresting officer regarding a pretrial statement, that the State committed improper prosecutorial argument in closing argument, and cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals as of right from the trial court’s order dismissing the indictment against the Defendant, Gary Campbell. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1); State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 721 (Tenn. 2008). Campbell was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1003. Campbell filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search of his residence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed Campbell’s indictment. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting the suppression motion and in dismissing the indictment because (1) the affidavit in support of the search warrant for Campbell’s property was sufficient to establish probable cause and (2) exigent circumstances supported the search. After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable law, we reverse the order of the trial court granting the motion to suppress, vacate the order dismissing the indictment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The City of Memphis appeals the dismissal of a parking ticket issued by the staff of the Downtown Memphis Commission. The City argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment against it based on a wrongful interpretation of the authority delegated by city ordinances. Additionally, The City argues that genuine issues of material fact remained that prevented summary judgment and contends that the circuit court erred in not granting a motion to alter or amend its order. We affirm.

This case involves a challenge to a decision to non-renew the employment of a non-tenured teacher. The plaintiff brought suit challenging her non-renewal on the basis that she did not receive six required observations per school year. In her complaint, the plaintiff challenged the non-renewal decision itself, stating it was procedurally flawed, and alleged the director improperly delegated the decision. After the plaintiff presented her proof at trial, the defendants moved for an involuntary dismissal. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case and remand.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court dismissed a Husband’s petition to modify or terminate the transitional alimony he was obligated to pay on the basis of the provision of the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement that made the alimony obligation nonmodifiable. Husband appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from a long-running divorce case. In 2009, Mitzi Sue Garner (“Wife”) sued Robert Allen Garner (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The matter was tried in 2010. An appeal to this Court was dismissed in 2012 for lack of a final order. In 2019, a final order at last was entered. Husband appeals. Husband raises several issues, including whether the Trial Court erred in its valuation of certain marital property, in determining his income for purposes of child support and temporary alimony, as well as in granting Wife an award of transitional alimony to secure certain marital debts assigned to Husband. We discern no reversible error. However, we modify the Trial Court’s characterization of Husband’s marital debt obligations from transitional alimony to alimony in solido. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified.

A husband and wife were divorced after three years of marriage. The trial court divided the marital assets and debts and designated the husband as the primary residential parent. The wife appeals the court’s finding of transmutation and designation of the husband as the primary residential parent, and both parties challenge aspects of the division of property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

Employee was injured in an automobile accident in the course and scope of his employment with Employer. The authorized treating physician and an authorized second opinion physician concluded that Employee suffered zero percent (0%) permanent impairment from his injury and released Employee to return to work. Employee did not successfully return to work and sought private medical treatment, including an independent medical examination (“IME”). The Employee’s IME physician assigned a seven percent (7%) permanent impairment rating. Employer then sought an independent medical evaluation from a physician chosen from the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”). The MIR physician assigned a two percent (2%) permanent impairment rating. The trial court adopted the seven percent (7%) permanent impairment rating and awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on a multiplier of three, having determined Employee failed to make a meaningful return to work, for an award of 21% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court further awarded 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and certain discretionary costs. Employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in adopting the rating of Employee’s IME physician rather than the MIR physician’s rating; in determining Employee did not make a meaningful return to work; in awarding extended temporary total disability benefits; and in awarding Employee his discretionary costs. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Following our review of the trial court’s judgment and the record on appeal, we modify in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part.

Kenneth Brian Coates (“Employee”) worked as a feed mill supervisor for Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Employer”). On June 6, 2013, Employee was using a sledge hammer to help unload soybean meal from a railcar when he started to feel pain in his elbows. Employee sought treatment with his family physician, who diagnosed him with tennis elbow in both arms, and informed him that his symptoms may resolve. On December 23, 2014, Employee met with an orthopedic surgeon who recommended surgery. The surgery was performed on Employee’s right elbow in January 2015 and on his left elbow in March 2015. Employee did not miss any work related to his injury until the date of his first surgery. Employee did not return to work for Employer following his surgeries. Employee filed a Request for a Benefit Review Conference with the Tennessee Department of Labor, which resulted in an impasse. Employee brought suit, and the trial court awarded him back temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the trial court determined that Employee’s claim was timely filed and that he did not have a meaningful return to work. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Ward, of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit aggravated burglary, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence regarding identity was insufficient to support the conclusion that he was the culprit, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s show-up identification, and that the trial court erred in denying relief when the State produced discovery mid-trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.