CLAY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Nima Nassiri appeals the district court’s judgment sua sponte denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus as barred by the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), id. § 2244(d)(1). On appeal, Nassiri argues that the counsel responsible for his late filing inadequately presented his equitable tolling argument before the district court, due to counsel’s conflicted interests.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND to allow Nassiri an opportunity to develop and present his equitable tolling argument anew, while represented by unconflicted counsel.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Walter Melara Martinez (Melara) presents us with a question of statutory interpretation that has divided our sister circuits: Are aliens in withholding-only proceedings detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 or 8 U.S.C. § 1231? This question is significant because aliens detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to bond hearings before an immigration judge (IJ) under the federal regulations, while aliens detained under § 1231(a) do not have a right to a bond hearing. In addition to the statutory interpretation issue, Melara argues that after two years of confinement, his continued detention—absent an individualized determination before a neutral decision maker—violates his due process rights.

The district court dismissed the case. In resolving the statutory interpretation question, we hold that § 1231(a) provides the authority for detaining aliens in withholding-only proceedings. Further, because Melara’s removal is reasonably foreseeable, his continued detention does not violate due process at this time under the framework set out in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Melara’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

The Petitioner, Tazarius Jay Vond Leach, appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief from his convictions of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of carjacking and his effective fifteen-year sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Benjamin R. Franklin, appeals his convictions for three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication and three counts of vehicular homicide by reckless driving. The Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by admitting Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) blood and urine test results; (2) the court erred by admitting photographs of the victims at the crash scene; (3) the evidence was insufficient relative to intoxication; (4) the court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial during the State’s rebuttal argument; and (5) the court erred in sentencing by imposing the maximum sentence, ordering consecutive sentencing, and suspending the Defendant’s driver’s license for ten years. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Adam Davis, sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after he was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of eight years’ imprisonment. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his right to counsel was violated by trial counsel’s failure to investigate and call character witnesses and failure to investigate and present medical evidence regarding his erectile dysfunction. He also urges this court to remand the case with an order for the post-conviction court to make further factual findings and credibility determinations. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court’s findings are adequate to permit review and that the post-conviction court did not err in determining that the Petitioner’s right to counsel was not violated. Accordingly, the post-conviction court’s judgment is affirmed.

Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment. Discerning no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision, we affirm and remand for a determination of Mother’s fees incurred in this appeal.

Grants & Denials List

Week of July 20, 2020 - July 24, 2020

Franklin D. Harris, Jr., and Gwendolyn G. Harris appeal the district court judgment that affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing their adversary proceeding. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff John George, a former professor at Youngstown State University (“YSU”), appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants in his employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit, which he brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. After he was previously denied tenure, George filed a discrimination lawsuit against YSU and was reinstated as part of a settlement agreement. But as soon as the university’s obligations under the agreement expired, it declined to renew George’s contract and terminated his employment. George also applied to several other positions within the university but was rejected. He then again filed suit in federal court.

Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of YSU on George’s claims, ruling that for each of them, George either failed to show causation, failed to show he was qualified for the job, or failed to show that YSU’s claimed reasons for firing (or not hiring) him were pretextual. The court also dismissed one of George’s failure-to-hire claims—which arose after this lawsuit was filed—based on an administrative exhaustion requirement. But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to George reveals a genuine dispute of material fact as to each of the claims he maintains on appeal, and the district court further erred in enforcing the administrative exhaustion requirement because Defendants expressly waived it below. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand this case for trial.

Eric Wayne Dotson, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).