In this post-conviction appeal, we clarify the appropriate standard to be applied when a criminal defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial. The petitioner, Antonio Howard, was convicted of several offenses, including aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. Following the conviction and sentencing, the petitioner’s trial counsel admittedly failed to file a timely motion for new trial. Consequently, the petitioner was found to have waived several issues on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief claiming, among other things, that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. However, the post-conviction court denied his request, concluding that trial counsel was deficient but that the petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficiency. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the post-conviction court that counsel was deficient for failing to file a timely motion for new trial but, relying on Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652, 658 (Tenn. 2003), held that the petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by the deficiency. The intermediate appellate court, therefore, concluded that the petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the petitioner was presumptively prejudiced under these circumstances. We conclude that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial does not require a presumption of prejudice, overruling this Court’s previous decision in Wallace. We have determined, therefore, that the post-conviction court properly considered whether the petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficiency, and we find no error in the post-conviction court’s conclusion that he was not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Federal prison officials seized one of Scott Callahan’s paintings and some mail-order photos on the ground that they violated the prison’s rules against possessing sexually explicit materials. After filing internal grievances without success, Callahan turned to federal court to seek money damages and other relief under the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech. The district court declined to create an implied cause of action, often called a Bivens claim, under the First Amendment for Callahan’s claim. We affirm.

The petitioner, Danny Jay Branam, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this post-conviction appeal, we clarify the appropriate standard to be applied when a criminal defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial. The petitioner, Antonio Howard, was convicted of several offenses, including aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. Following the conviction and sentencing, the petitioner’s trial counsel admittedly failed to file a timely motion for new trial. Consequently, the petitioner was found to have waived several issues on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief claiming, among other things, that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. However, the post-conviction court denied his request, concluding that trial counsel was deficient but that the petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficiency. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the post-conviction court that counsel was deficient for failing to file a timely motion for new trial but, relying on Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652, 658 (Tenn. 2003), held that the petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by the deficiency. The intermediate appellate court, therefore, concluded that the petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the petitioner was presumptively prejudiced under these circumstances. We conclude that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial does not require a presumption of prejudice, overruling this Court’s previous decision in Wallace. We have determined, therefore, that the post-conviction court properly considered whether the petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficiency, and we find no error in the post-conviction court’s conclusion that he was not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

A majority of the Judges of this Court in regular active service has voted for rehearing en banc of this case.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Tony Lynn Nix, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of nine years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and requests plain error review of improper statements by the prosecutor. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a bizarre set of circumstances involving two women, a deputy sheriff, and a crate full of cats and kittens. Joan Elizabeth Weser and Kimberly Goodson met through their joint work with an animal-rescue organization called Loudon County Friends of Animals (LCFOA). Weser owns a farm in Loudon County, which she allowed the organization to use as a cat-rescue facility. Later, however, after Weser and Goodson had a falling out, LCFOA ceased its operations on Weser’s farm.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Anderson and Goodson on all of Weser’s claims. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in favor of Goodson as to all claims against her. With respect to Anderson, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in his favor as to the federal claims and the state-law claim for malicious prosecution, VACATE the district court’s judgment in his favor as to the state-law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, and REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to those remaining claims.

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Kevin Malone injured his hand while using a table saw. He and his wife Colleen sued the saw’s manufacturer and the other companies that brought the saw to market. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for lack of personal jurisdiction and the Malones now appeal. We vacate the judgment and remand.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant, David Rivera, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), fourth offense, but properly reserved, in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), a certified question of law regarding the legality of his traffic stop. Because the Defendant’s traffic stop was supported by probable cause, or at a minimum, reasonable suspicion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a premises liability action arising from an injury suffered by a guest who slipped on ice in the parking lot of a hotel. The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is no dispute of material fact and that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was properly granted; accordingly, we affirm.