This case concerns a municipality’s attempt to restrict the persons who are able to collect and dispose of construction waste within its city limits. In relevant part, the municipality generally prohibits persons from collecting and disposing of waste accumulated within its borders. That task is reserved, subject to certain exceptions, to the municipality, who has entered into an exclusive contract with a corporate entity for waste disposal. The Appellants herein are a waste disposal services company and its managing member. The managing member was cited individually in the municipality’s Environmental Court for unauthorized refuse and trash disposal, and he was found to be in violation of the municipal ordinance. A de novo appeal was thereafter taken to the Circuit Court, where the waste disposal services company became a participating party. Among other things, the waste disposal services company asserted that the municipality’s effort to circumscribe waste collection was a violation of the Tennessee Constitution’s anti-monopoly and equal protection provisions. These constitutional claims were dismissed at summary judgment. In addition to its asserted constitutional claims, the waste disposal services company averred that certain of the City’s municipal ordinances provided it with authority to conduct its operations. Following a later hearing, the Circuit Court declined to issue any fines but nonetheless enjoined the waste disposal services company from further removal of waste when it was not the actual producer of waste. Several issues are now raised for our review on appeal. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the injunction is vacated.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s sentence in federal court can be enhanced by his prior conviction in state court. An earlier state drug crime, for instance, will often boost prison time for a federal one. But not always. The guidelines have just one definition of drug crimes that can enhance sentences (“controlled-substance offenses”), yet each state defines its drug crimes in its own way—sometimes in ways that venture beyond the guidelines’ definition. Willie Garth’s appeal from his sentence requires us to decide whether his prior Tennessee conviction for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver counts as a sentence-enhancing controlled-substance offense. We hold that it does, and affirm Garth’s sentence.

The petitioner, Kane Stackhouse, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2008 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, the petitioner claims, as he did below, that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Catherine Ann Pinhal, was convicted upon her 2019 guilty pleas of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, and two counts of possession of contraband in a penal facility, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-213 (2019) (vehicular homicide); 39-16-201 (2019) (possession of contraband). The length and manner of service of her sentence were reserved for the trial court’s determination. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed six years for the vehicular homicide conviction and four years for each possession of contraband in a penal facility conviction. The court, likewise imposed partial consecutive service, for an effective ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for alternative sentencing and by imposing consecutive service. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Darius Patterson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more but less than 15 grams of heroin, possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, evading arrest, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a felony, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentencing decision of the trial court. We discern no error in the proceedings below, and, as a result, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lonnie Duane Orr, appeals from the trial court’s community corrections revocation for his eight-year, Range III sentence for his conviction of burglary. He contends that the court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Jarrett A. Jones, on one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (over 100 images) and thirty-four counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, all Class B felonies. Petitioner pled guilty as a Range I offender to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (over 100 images) and two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. All other counts were dismissed based upon his guilty plea. The trial court sentenced Petitioner, pursuant to the plea agreement, to eight years at 100% on each count and ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief in a written order. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we reverse the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal and remand with instructions for another judge to be designated to preside over this case.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Sometimes timing is everything. After this appeal, Gregory Raymore would almost certainly agree. A jury convicted him as a felon in possession of a firearm before the Supreme Court decided a case that heightened that offense’s mens rearequirement. Understandably, he failed to challenge his indictment and the court’s jury instructions on that basis until this appeal. Given that, we review those challenges only for plain error and they fail under that standard. The other arguments he raises against his conviction and his sentence also fail. So we AFFIRM.

The Defendant, George Anthony Vasser, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of selling or delivering cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2018). He received a sentence of eight years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence does not support the Defendant’s conviction for selling or delivering, (2) the evidence only supports a conviction for the lesser included offense of casual exchange of drugs, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to enter a judgment of acquittal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.