The petitioner, Anthony Thompson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of first degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Eddie Smith, appeals his conviction for second degree murder and his twentyone- year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1) excluding proof of the victim’s prior bad acts as corroborative evidence that the victim was the initial aggressor and (2) instructing the jury that Defendant had a duty to retreat before using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury in selfdefense. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Carlton Smith, of three counts of burglary and one count each of assault and theft. As a result of his convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 12 years’ confinement for each count of burglary and 11 months and 29 days for assault and theft. The trial court merged the three burglary convictions into one count and ordered the defendant’s sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges the application of the burglary statute, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and claims his misdemeanor convictions for theft and assault should merge into his conviction for burglary. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we conclude the defendant’s convictions for assault and theft should be merged with his conviction for burglary and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of amended judgments in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant, William Johnson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Kenneth Darrin Fisher, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Specifically, the petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly prepare the petitioner to testify at trial; failing to object to the State’s assertion that the gun found in the petitioner’s vehicle was an “assault rifle;” failing to object to the admission of the unredacted video of the petitioner’s police interview; and failing to appeal the trial court’s admission of Ms. Burchett’s recorded preliminary hearing testimony. The petitioner also asserts he was deprived due process when the post-conviction court sustained the State’s objection regarding Ms. Green’s testimony. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The mother of an eight-year-old child petitioned to have the primary residential parent designation changed from the father to herself. The juvenile court found she failed to show that a material change of circumstance warranted such a change, and she appealed. We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.

This consolidated appeal concerns a father’s action, filed pro se, to be granted custody of his child, or, in the alternative, reasonable visitation without the requirement of paying child support. Following a series of hearings in juvenile court, the father was named the primary residential parent, a permanent parenting plan was adopted, and the child support proceedings were assigned a separate docket number to be handled by Maximus/Child Support Services. Because the action was originally yet mistakenly filed as a dependency and neglect action by the father, the mother appealed the juvenile court’s decision to circuit court. On the father’s motion to alter or amend, the juvenile court struck the dependency and neglect language from its order, and the circuit court then dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision in decreeing this matter a paternity and visitation action, and we find that the circuit court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Defendants Calvin Smith and Hayden Bowen for attempted first degree murder in counts one and three and for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in counts two and four. Each Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the failure of the State to name a specific victim in counts one and three violated their right against double jeopardy. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed all counts of the indictment. The State appeals as of right from the trial court’s dismissal of Defendants’ indictment, arguing that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictment based on the weight of the evidence and that the indictment provided sufficient protection against double jeopardy. After a thorough review, the judgments of the criminal court are reversed, the indictment is reinstated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

COLE, Chief Judge. Robert Ware was convicted in 1997 of several federal drug offenses and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. In 2019, Ware moved for a sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act. The district court concluded that Ware was eligible for relief under the Act but denied Ware’s motion as a matter of discretion. Ware now appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by 1) insufficiently considering the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 2) putting undue weight on the legislative purpose of the First Step Act, and 3) inadequately considering that Ware’s statutory sentencing range would be lower under current law. We affirm.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Ervine Lee Davenport was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial in Michigan state court. He challenges his conviction in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because he was visibly shackled at the waist, wrist, and ankles during trial. The State of Michigan admits Davenport’s shackling was unconstitutional but argues that the habeas petition should be denied because this error was harmless. The district court agreed it was harmless error and denied the petition. Because “shackling is ‘inherently prejudicial,’” Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)), and the evidence of premeditation and deliberation necessary to a first-degree murder conviction was not overwhelming, the State has not met its burden to show the restraints did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court, GRANT Davenport a conditional writ of habeas corpus, and REMAND the case for further proceedings.