CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Sherryl Darby underwent a double mastectomy following diagnosis of the growth of abnormal pre-cancerous cells along with a genetic mutation that contributes to abnormal cell growth. Invoking the Americans with Disabilities Act and Ohio law, Darby alleges she was discriminated against when her employer terminated her employment upon learning of her condition. The district court dismissed her claims, concluding that Darby’s genetic mutation had not yet manifested into a disability cognizable under the ADA. Because Darby has plausibly alleged a condition covered by the ADA, we REVERSE.

Petitioner, Joseph S. McNair, Jr., appeals from the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal and in his pro se petition, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court permitted the State to improperly amend the original indictment. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Marquette Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Chambers, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony vandalism of property in an amount $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-408, a Class D felony.1 The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to six years to be served on supervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for felony vandalism. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Donquise Tremonte Alexander, entered a guilty plea to second-degree murder and was sentenced to thirty years in confinement. Following a motion to correct an illegal sentence and an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition to correct a clerical error on his judgment form, alleging that the form was not stamped “filed.” The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Following our review, we affirm.

This is a negligence case arising out of an injury suffered by a middle school student when a chair fell on his finger in his school’s lunchroom. The trial court determined that summary judgment was warranted as a matter of law because there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that a dangerous condition existed and because the incident was not foreseeable. We conclude that there is no dispute of material fact and that summary judgment in favor of the school district was properly granted; accordingly, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to change the non-marital children’s surname from that of the mother to the father. We vacate the trial court’s decision and remand for findings of fact to facilitate appellate review.

In this wrongful death action, the plaintiff, the decedent’s spouse, asserted claims against multiple defendants. The plaintiff settled with all but one of the defendants prior to trial, and the settling defendants were dismissed from the case. At trial, the sole remaining defendant asserted the comparative fault of the decedent and the settling defendants. The jury assigned percentages of fault to the decedent, the defendant, and the settling defendants but returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The jury found noneconomic damages that, when reduced by the percentage of the decedent’s fault, exceeded the statutory cap. So the trial court entered a judgment against the defendant based on its percentage fault as applied to the statutory cap. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the statutory cap was incorrectly applied. We affirm.

Question:

Would HB 2919/SB 2925, 111th Tenn. Gen. Assem. (2020), which is intended to exempt the city of Athens from the operation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-1425(a) by means of a narrow population bracket, raise constitutional concerns?

Opinion:

Yes. Both article I, section 8 and article XI, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution require that a population bracket designed to exempt a particular county or municipality from a tax law be supported by some rational basis related directly to the size of the bracketed population. Because there does not appear to be such a rational basis for creating a narrow population-bracket exception from Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-1425 for the city of Athens, the proposed legislation raises significant constitutional concerns.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Any number of federal constitutional and statutory provisions reflect the proposition that, in this country, we determine guilt or innocence individually—rather than collectively, based on one’s identification with some demographic group. That principle has not always been perfectly realized in our Nation’s history, but as judges it is one that we take an oath to enforce. Here, the relevant statute is Title IX of the Higher Education Act of 1965, which bars universities that receive federal funds from discriminating against students based on their sex. John Doe argues that his complaint in this case adequately stated a claim that Oberlin College did precisely that when it determined his responsibility on a sexual-assault allegation. We agree, and reverse the district court’s decision to the contrary.