The Defendant, Samuel McAlister, entered a partially open guilty plea in case number 18-501 for possession of marijuana, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of drug paraphernalia; and in case number 18-956, for driving on a revoked license, failing to illuminate his license plate, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Cuben Lagrone, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Appellant, Mario Johnson, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Defendant, Joseph Lester Haven, was convicted pursuant to a bench trial of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against his stepchildren, and he received an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, he asserts that the State failed to establish venue, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, that the State improperly failed to elect the factual bases of the convictions, that the trial court improperly considered evidence of other bad acts included in the forensic interviews, that the forensic interviewer was not qualified under statute, and that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factors to his offenses. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the State failed to establish venue for the aggravated sexual battery conviction in Count 4, and we reverse this conviction and sentence and remand for any further proceedings. The Defendant has not demonstrated that he is entitled to any other appellate relief, and we affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charles Bernard Griffin, appeals his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and possession of a firearm while having a prior felony conviction involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of seventy-five years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of his motion to bifurcate the trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher Bailey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of rape of child and sentenced to twenty-five years at one-hundred percent. Petitioner contends on appeal that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He contends that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to file a pre-trial motion in limine; (2) failing to object when the State asked the victim to testify about other times in which Petitioner forced the victim to perform oral sex; (3) asking the victim’s stepsister about her opinion of Petitioner’s character for truthfulness; (4) asking the victim why she slept downstairs; (5) failing to object when the State asked the victim about counseling and her medication; and (6) failing to argue during the Rule 412 hearing that Petitioner should be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual behavior. Petitioner further argues: that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants post-conviction relief; that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s request for funding for an investigator; and that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s request to call the prosecutor as a witness at the post-conviction hearing. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial in the underlying contract action and upon a verdict finding misrepresentation/concealment, the trial court entered a monetary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Ski Chalet Village Owners Club, Inc. (“Ski Chalet”), and against the defendants, Richard Pate and Clint Bowman d/b/a P&B Construction & Remodeling, and J. Ron Dillmon, jointly and severally, in the amount of $166,401.26 for compensatory damages plus $190,000.00 in punitive damages.1 The trial court also awarded to Ski Chalet a $1,000.00 judgment against Mr. Dillmon on a separate claim of defamation. Upon Mr. Dillmon’s subsequent pro se motion, the trial court denied his request for a new trial, finding, inter alia, that Mr. Dillmon had failed to meet his burden of providing a valid excuse for his failure to appear at trial, failed to file any pleadings stating the reason for his failure to appear, and refused to testify under oath when given an opportunity to explain his failure to appear. In addition, the trial court found that an affidavit executed by a physician who had treated Mr. Dillmon, which Mr. Dillmon had filed with his motion for a new trial, did not sufficiently support a valid reason for Mr. Dillmon’s failure to appear. The trial court subsequently denied a motion filed by Mr. Dillmon for production of the trial transcript. Concerning a motion for the trial court judge’s recusal and a motion for contempt against opposing counsel filed by Mr. Dillmon after he had filed a notice of appeal, the trial court entered an order finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider either motion. Mr. Dillmon has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Upon an issue raised by Ski Chalet, we decline to find the appeal frivolous and deny Ski Chalet’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses on appeal.

This is an appeal from an order denying the defendants’ motions seeking to compel the parties to participate in mandatory arbitration. The trial court denied the motions to compel arbitration with respect to “the issue of the unconscionability of the precise agreement to arbitrate or delegation to arbitration” and “the issue of cancellation of the purchase agreements,” finding that such issues presented questions for the court rather than an arbitrator. The trial court also determined that the defendants had not waived their right to arbitration. The defendants timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Zacharious Cole, appeals from the order of the Madison County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief from his jury convictions of attempted first-degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective term of twenty-six years’ imprisonment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court determined that trial counsel’s advice to the Petitioner to enter a post-sentencing waiver of his right to direct appeal was deficient but not prejudicial. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief.1 Because the record shows that the Petitioner was denied the right to pursue a direct appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel, this matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order allowing the filing of a motion for new trial. See T.C.A. § 40-30-113(a)(3). Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. This appeal involves a Chris Rock video and a cartoon, but it is no laughing matter. In fact, this case raises a gravely important issue—police use of force—that has dominated the nation’s attention in recent weeks. Lamar Wright, an African American man, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of unconstitutional excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and municipal liability, along with state-law claims, relating to the actions of certain police officers and other officials employed by the City of Euclid, Ohio.

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court’s judgment, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.