Petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault by a Sevier County jury. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a direct appeal. This Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Mark Lipton, No. E2012-02197-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4365969, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2015). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief on January 12, 2016. On February 2, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition seeking relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The same day Petitioner filed the petition for DNA analysis, he filed an amended post-conviction petition. Petitioner filed two additional amended post-conviction petitions. In the final amended petition, Petitioner abandoned arguments in his prior petitions and argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel (1) failed to file a motion to disqualify the District Attorney; (2) failed file a change of venue motion; (3) failed to request specific Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) findings of fact; and (4) erred by calling a particular trial witness. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for DNA analysis and the Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) issue in the petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction petition denied relief on the remaining issues. After a reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Marquail Patterson, Defendant, was found guilty by a jury of unlawful possession of a handgun, second degree murder, and five counts of attempted reckless endangerment after a shooting at Studio X in Knoxville in the summer of 2014 during which one person was killed and five people were injured. Defendant received an effective sentence of thirty years in incarceration to be served at 100%. In this delayed appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to Defendant’s convictions for unlawful possession of a handgun and second degree murder. However, we vacate Defendant’s convictions for attempted reckless endangerment because Defendant was convicted of a crime which does not exist. Therefore, those convictions are void. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Defendant, Christina Eads, appeals the revocation of her supervised probation for her simple possession of a Schedule VI drug and possession of drug paraphernalia convictions. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentence incarcerated. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After presenting with a criminal record that consists of 21 prior felony convictions and 16 prior misdemeanor convictions, Defendant, Earl Harold Crisp, appeals the trial court’s refusal to grant an alternative sentence despite his eligibility for probation. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, we apply the Teacher Tenure Act to the transfer of a tenured teacher, working as a school administrator, for lack of proper credentialing. The plaintiff school administrator challenges the decision of the director of schools to transfer him to a teaching position because the plaintiff did not have an administrator license. The trial court upheld the transfer. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that a regulation required the director to review the administrative duties the plaintiff had performed in the past in order to determine whether an administrator license was required, and that the director’s failure to do so rendered his transfer decision arbitrary and capricious. Under Tennessee caselaw, judicial review of a school system director’s decision to transfer a teacher must be conducted in light of the director’s broad discretion to make such decisions. The proof showed that the director and the board of the school system had established certain priorities for its administrators. Absent an administrator license, in the upcoming school year, the regulation would have precluded the plaintiff from performing duties consistent with the school system’s priorities. Consequently, the director’s failure to consider the plaintiff’s past work did not render the transfer decision either arbitrary or capricious. Under these circumstances, we hold that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that the transfer decision was not made in good faith and was arbitrary, capricious, or improperly motivated. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of the school board.

Week of June 8, 2020 - June 12, 2020

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Norman David West pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally distributing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At West’s sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence of 40 months’ imprisonment.

West now appeals his sentence. He argues that the district court incorrectly applied the two-level enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2D1.1(b)(1) for the possession of a firearm during a drug-related offense. West also contends that the 40-month sentence was unreasonable under the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

This is a termination of parental rights cases. The trial court terminated Appellant mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; (3) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to removal of the children; (5) severe child abuse; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his children on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to support, (3) abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility of the children. The trial court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Finding clear and convincing evidence in support of the trial court’s determinations, we affirm.

Decedent died in 2015 and his widow submitted his latest will for probate in March 2016. Children from a prior marriage filed a will contest in August 2016, alleging a will dating from 1984 constituted Decedent’s last will and testament and all later wills were the result of fraud and undue influence. The widow and her children challenged the will contest on various grounds, all of which the probate court rejected. The probate court entered an order directing the court clerk to certify the will submitted to probate in addition to three earlier original wills and a partial codicil to the circuit court for a trial to determine which document(s), if any, constituted Decedent’s last will and testament. We affirm the decision of the probate court.