An employee filed and settled a workers’ compensation claim against her employer for injuries sustained in an assault. The employee then filed a complaint under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 to -702, alleging that the assault, in conjunction with a previous incident, constituted sexual harassment that created a hostile work environment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer, and the employee appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Petitioner was convicted by a Madison County jury of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of sixty-one years’ imprisonment. State v. Michael John Stitts, No. W2017-00209-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 2065043, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2018), appeal denied (Aug. 8, 2018). After his convictions were affirmed by this Court, the Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on various grounds, which was denied following a hearing. In this appeal, the Petitioner raises the same issues and contends that trial counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to conduct a proper investigation into the facts of the case; (2) failing to object to improper witness testimony; (3) failing to adequately cross-examine witnesses; (4) failing to file certain pre-trial motions; and (5) failing to ensure juror impartiality. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Rodolfo Guerra-Rosales, pleaded guilty in General Sessions Court to misdemeanor drug possession, and the court imposed a probation sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition in circuit court, alleging that his guilty plea in general sessions court was involuntary based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the claim was not cognizable and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court had jurisdiction to consider the petition and that his petition stated a colorable claim. After review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner’s claim.

Paul Kolb, Movant, pled guilty on November 18, 2011, to rape of a child, rape, incest, and aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years at one hundred percent service. On April 10, 2018, Movant filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct what he claimed was an illegal sentence in Count 1, rape of a child. The trial court determined the sentence was not illegal and dismissed the motion. We affirm.

The Defendant, Daniel L. Ginther, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his eight-year sentence for passing worthless checks in the amount of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement in spite of the Defendant’s “serious medical issues.” Following our review, we affirm.

This case involves a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) extended to the co-defendant, Douglas V. Mashek, by the plaintiff, Tennessee State Bank (“the Bank”), via a promissory note secured by a deed of trust encumbering real property titled to Mr. Mashek and acquired during Mr. Mashek’s marriage to the co-defendant, Deborah A. Mashek. When the Bank subsequently attempted to foreclose on the property, Mr. Mashek objected based on alterations to the deed of trust and a notice of right of rescission that had allegedly occurred after the deed’s execution and prior to recordation. The Bank filed a complaint against the Masheks in the trial court, seeking declaratory judgment that the recorded deed of trust was valid and enforceable, or in the alternative, reformation of the executed deed of trust to conform to the recorded deed. The Bank also named the title company involved in the loan transaction as a third-party defendant, alleging the title company’s liability in the event that the trial court found the deed of trust, either as executed or as recorded, to be unenforceable. The Masheks, proceeding pro se, filed various pleadings in response to the complaint, including a counterclaim against the Bank, alleging, inter alia, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, equitable estoppel, slander of title, statutory estoppel, wrongful foreclosure, and unclean hands. Upon the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion as to reformation of the executed deed of trust, declaring the deed, as reformed, to be enforceable and finding that the Bank was entitled to pursue foreclosure proceedings. The trial court found in part that the Bank or its agent(s) had employed “procedurally questionable and perhaps fraudulent” methods that were “at the very least negligent and potentially criminal in nature” to correct mistakes in the executed deed of trust and to, without authorization, affix the Masheks’ initials over a change in a date of signature on the notice of right of rescission. However, having also found that the mistakes corrected were mutual and amounted to scrivener’s errors that were not intended to and did not prejudice the Masheks, the trial court granted the Bank’s request to reform the executed deed of trust. The trial court awarded to the Bank a monetary judgment against Mr. Mashek, as the sole debtor named in the loan documents, in the amount of $294,566.39 for unpaid principal and interest. The trial court also awarded to the Bank reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $8,795.84, limiting such fees to those that “would be expected in an ordinary foreclosure action.” The trial court dismissed the Masheks’ various counterclaims and subsequently denied the Bank’s motion to alter or amend language in the judgment. The Masheks have appealed, and the Bank has raised issues regarding the trial court’s denial of its request to alter the court’s findings and denial of its request for additional attorney’s fees and expenses. Having determined that the Bank or its agent(s) made a unilateral mistake in materially altering the deed of trust after the document’s execution and then recording the altered deed of trust with the unilateral mistake incorporated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to the reformation and enforceability of the executed deed of trust. Having also determined that the action of the Bank or its agent(s) in affixing the Masheks’ initials over the altered date on the rescission notice without authorization or notice constituted gross negligence, we reverse the trial court’s finding that no gross negligence occurred but affirm the trial court’s implied finding that the Bank could not succeed in its request to reform the effective date of the rescission notice. However, concluding that no alterations were made to the promissory note, we further determine that the trial court properly found Mr. Mashek to be liable for the unpaid principal and interest due under the terms of the note. We therefore affirm the trial court’s $294,566.39 monetary judgment against Mr. Mashek. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses to the Bank and remand for a hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the Bank solely to obtain a judgment based on the promissory note. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including its denial of the Bank’s request for additional attorney’s fees and expenses and its denial of the Bank’s motion to alter or amend the language of the judgment. Finally, we clarify that no evidence has been presented in this case to support a finding of the intent necessary for forgery as a cause of action against the Bank or its agent(s).

This appeal concerns the trial court’s designation of the father as the minor children’s primary residential parent after establishing his paternity. During trial, the court granted the father’s motion in limine to exclude testimony from the mother’s expert witness. The mother appeals the trial court’s evidentiary ruling and the designation of primary residential parent. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

Lacy B. and Quentin B. (collectively, “Petitioners”) filed a petition for adoption and to terminate the parental rights of the mother, Morgan S. (“Mother”), to the minor child, Aryana S. (“the Child”). The Trial Court found that Petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and severe child abuse existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights but that termination of her rights was not in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Xavier Porter has committed more than a few armed robberies during his lifetime. He now argues that those robberies don’t qualify as “violent felonies” or “crimes of violence” under federal law. The district court rejected his arguments. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Danny Hill asserts in his habeas petition that the State of Ohio may not execute him because he is intellectually disabled. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Atkins, the case that bars the execution of intellectually disabled defendants, was decided and made retroactive after Hill was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Prior to Atkins, Hill had raised his intellectual disability as a mitigating factor in the penalty phase of his trial. See State v. Hill, Nos. 3720, 3745, 1989 WL 142761 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1989). Three psychological experts testified in that proceeding that Hill was intellectually disabled. The Ohio courts agreed, stating that Hill “suffers from some mental retardation” and is “mildly to moderately retarded.” See id. at *6; State v. Hill, 595 N.E.2d 884, 901 (Ohio 1992) (discussing the experts’ testimony). But ultimately, Hill was sentenced to death because all that his intellectual disability counted for at the time was a point in his favor in the sentencing calculation—not a bar to his execution. See Hill, 1989 WL 142761, at *4. When Atkins came down, our court issued a remand order directing the Ohio courts to formally assess Hill’s intellectual functioning under Atkins. Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2002). Even though “Ohio courts reviewing his case have concluded that Danny Hill is retarded, and voluminous expert testimony supported this conclusion,” we issued a remand because Hill’s Atkins claim “ha[d] not been exhausted or conceded.” Id. (citations omitted). This time around, the Ohio courts decided that Hill was not intellectually disabled. See State v. Hill, 894 N.E.2d 108, 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

We hold that Hill is intellectually disabled and that he cannot be sentenced to death. No person looking at this record could reasonably deny that Hill is intellectually disabled under Atkins. In holding otherwise, the Ohio courts avoided giving serious consideration to past evidence of Hill’s intellectual disability. Doing so amounted to an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of even the general Atkins standard. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case with instructions to grant the petition and to issue the writ of habeas corpus with respect to Hill’s death sentence.

In addition to his Atkins claim, Hill raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that attacks his trial counsel’s performance during his state Atkins hearing, a Miranda claim arguing that certain statements should have been suppressed during his trial, a prosecutorial-misconduct claim, and a due-process claim arguing that Hill was not competent to stand trial at the time of his convictions. For the reasons set forth below, and as explained in our prior opinion, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying Hill’s habeas petition with regard to the latter three claims, and pretermit the ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding Atkins because we are granting relief on the merits of the Atkins claim.