This wrongful-death action arises out of the death of a Lemay Concrete employee who was struck and killed by a third party’s cement-mixer truck while acting in the course and scope of his employment. The issues in this appeal are post-settlement disputes concerning an attorney’s fee lien filed by the plaintiffs’ first attorney, a subrogation lien filed by the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, and the assessment of postsettlement discretionary costs against the carrier. The employee’s family instituted this action after agreeing to pay their first attorney 33% of the gross recovery or “a reasonable attorney’s fee” if they discharged him before recovering. While the action was pending, the insurance carrier paid workers’ compensation benefits to the family and, after declining a settlement offer of $400,000, the plaintiffs discharged their attorney. The plaintiffs then retained substitute counsel. Months later, the wrongful-death claim was settled for $1,350,000. The plaintiffs then sought to void their first attorney’s fee agreement and requested the trial court deduct a portion of their substitute counsel’s fees from the carrier’s subrogation lien. The trial court referred all issues to a special master. The special master found the fee agreement was valid and recommended a fee of $133,333—or 33% of $400,000, the amount of the last “firm offer” secured during the first attorney’s representation. The special master’s report contained no findings and identified no factors relied upon in determining that $133,333 was a “reasonable fee,” other than finding the amount would be one-third of the last “firm offer” obtained by the first attorney. The special master also found the carrier’s own counsel protected its subrogation lien and, thus, recommended that the carrier not be liable for any portion of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. The trial court adopted verbatim the special master’s findings and recommendations. Additionally, the court assessed post-settlement discretionary costs against the carrier in lieu of a deduction for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. This appeal followed. We have determined that the fee awarded to the plaintiffs’ first attorney was not based on the relevant legal principles or applicable facts because the trial court’s ruling was based entirely on the special master’s recommendation—which addressed only one of the guidelines in Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) for determining what a reasonable fee is. Therefore, we vacate the fee awarded to the plaintiffs’ first attorney and remand this issue to the trial court to award “a reasonable fee” that is based on the relevant facts and factors. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling that the workers’ compensation carrier was not liable for any portion of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and remand this issue for apportionment of the fees incurred by the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Accordingly, we also reverse the assessment of discretionary costs against the workers’ compensation carrier and remand this issue for reconsideration.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff David Jones appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants Clark County, Kentucky; Clark County Sheriff Berl Perdue; and Clark County Sheriff’s Deputy Lee Murray, in this case alleging malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE IN PART and AFFIRM IN PART the district court’s order. We REVERSE the district court’s order with respect to the grant of summary judgment and qualified immunity for Murray and REMAND the case for trial. We AFFIRM the district court’s order granting summary judgment with respect to all other Defendants.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Manuel Guzman, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s denial of his application for withholding of removal. Because the IJ and BIA erred in failing to give Guzman an opportunity to explain why he could not reasonably obtain certain corroborative evidence, because substantial evidence does not support the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and BIA’s determinations regarding the unavailability of evidence to corroborate Guzman’s claim about abuse by his stepfather, and because the BIA incorrectly required Guzman to demonstrate that his membership in a particular social group was “at least one central reason” for his persecution, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA’s order, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Jane Doe alleges that the University of Kentucky (UK) violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 86 Stat. 373, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., by responding with deliberate indifference to her accusations of student-on-student harassment. Because Jane Doe failed to show that UK’s response subjected her to further actionable harassment that caused Title IX injuries, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Grants & Denials List

May 11, 2020 - May 15, 2020

The grandparents of a minor child filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish two statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Following our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment to include a determination of clear and convincing evidence of the additional statutory ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s custody. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Petitioner, Robert Simmons, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner maintains that he timely filed his petition and is entitled to a hearing. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Deangelo Love, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and criminal attempt aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to bolster a witness’s testimony with a prior consistent statement; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s request for an alibi instruction; and (4) whether the Defendant is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the relevant facts and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Jamarian Cortez Jordan, for aggravated robbery, and a jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years’ incarceration with an eighty-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress Defendant’s confession, (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (3) that Defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury, (4) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Defendant’s mother to testify at trial as to Defendant’s disability, (5) that Defendant should have received the minimum sentence, and (6) that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Torrance Johnson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1997 conviction for first-degree felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.