The Defendant, Chad Everette Henry, pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and driving under the influence (“DUI”). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twelve years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days with forty-five days’ confinement for the conviction of DUI, second offense. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court imposed an improper sentence and that his plea to DUI was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Jurmaine Jeffries of drug-related offenses, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The district court granted Jeffries’s motion for a new trial, finding that it erroneously failed to include jury instructions that required the United States to prove proximate causation in addition to but-for causation. On appeal, the United States argues that § 841(b)(1)(C) requires proof of only but-for causation. We agree and therefore REVERSE and REMAND for sentencing.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs concerning their claim for surreptitious recording of their conversations, namely wiretapping. We affirm.

Appellants, a doctor and a medical clinic, challenge a final order of the Tennessee Commissioner of Health imposing monetary fines and costs. The order followed the investigation and prosecution of numerous violations of state statutes and regulations governing pain management clinics. After review of an initial decision from an administrative law judge, the Commissioner’s Designee found three additional violations and increased the assessment of civil penalties and costs issued in the initial ruling. Appellants argue that the new violations were not supported by substantial and material evidence and were arbitrary and capricious under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Further, they argue that the increase in penalties and costs was arbitrary and capricious. Because the decision appealed was supported by substantial and material evidence and neither arbitrary nor capricious, we affirm.

In this appeal, the employer challenges the trial court’s determination that the employee’s liver, kidney, and cardiac conditions, which the trial court concluded were an occupational disease, arose primarily from exposure to heavy metal contaminants in the workplace. The trial court concluded the testimony of the employee’s expert witnesses should be afforded greater weight than the testimony of the employer’s experts and that the employee had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged occupational diseases arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment, considering all causes. The employer contends the trial court erred in assessing the weight given the expert testimony and asserts the preponderance of the evidence weighs against the trial court’s conclusions. The employee asserts the trial court correctly weighed the medical proof but questions the constitutionality of the statutory definition of “injury” and “personal injury” as applied to occupational diseases. Having carefully reviewed the record, we reverse the trial court’s order awarding benefits and certify as final the trial court’s order as reversed.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Benjamin Foreman appeals the district court’s order granting his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”). He raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the First Step Act requires district courts to conduct a plenary resentencing of any defendant deemed eligible for relief under the law. Specifically, Foreman contends that the district court erred by refusing to grant his requests for an in-person hearing and reconsideration of his career offender status. Second, Foreman argues that his reduced sentence is unreasonable. He maintains that, because he should no longer be classified as a career offender, the district court unreasonably varied upward from his true Guidelines range. Foreman also contends that the district court erred when it allegedly failed to recognize that he was eligible for a reduced term of supervised release.

As we have previously concluded, nothing in the First Step Act entitles a defendant to a plenary resentencing. Moreover, we hold that the district court properly imposed Foreman’s reduced sentence. In doing so, we find that we have authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) to review Foreman’s claim that the district court’s sentencing determination was unreasonable. Although our precedents indicate that reasonableness review does not apply to certain sentence-reduction proceedings, we find that the First Step Act is distinguishable and decline to extend those precedents to First Step Act proceedings. We nevertheless hold that Foreman’s reduced sentence was reasonable. We therefore affirm.

A Trousdale County jury convicted the defendant, Jerry A. Thigpen, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motions to recuse; the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; trial counsel was ineffective; the imposed sentence was excessive; the court reporter should have disqualified herself; the indictment was fatally erred; the jury was biased; trial counsel colluded with the State and the trial court; and the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also argues he was denied the right to counsel on appeal. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Joseph R. Patton, pled guilty in the Wilson County Criminal Court to three counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor and three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Pursuant to the plea agreements, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the Appellant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years to be served in confinement. On appeal, he contends that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard L. Jerger, Jr., appeals the order of the Bradley County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a dispute over an easement agreement (“the Agreement”). In 1995, Samir F. Mishu and Faud E. Mishu, d/b/a M&M Investments (“M&M”), conveyed the eastern parcel of certain land it owned to Excellent Properties, L.P. (“Excellent”). The parties also entered into the Agreement, which provided for a future easement that would connect their properties. The easement’s precise location and dimensions were undefined. Years passed, both properties put in curbing without cuts on their boundaries, and the easement went unutilized. In 2015, Downey Oil Company, Inc. (“Downey”), then lessee of the western parcel, sought for the first time to construct and use the easement. Slyreal Properties, Inc. (“Slyreal”), then owner of the eastern parcel, refused. Downey and M&M (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) brought suit against Slyreal, Pinnacle Bank and Hugh Queener, trustee (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants asserted adverse possession and abandonment. After a trial, the Trial Court ruled for Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We find and hold, inter alia, that Defendants failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the easement was extinguished by adverse possession or that it was abandoned by Plaintiffs. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for a determination of the easement’s location and dimensions.