The plaintiffs in this construction defect action appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their case with prejudice for failure to comply with the court’s orders. They also allege error concerning the trial court’s refusal to recuse itself, the disqualification of counsel, and the decision to report counsel’s conduct to the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility. We vacate the order of dismissal with prejudice and direct entry of dismissal without prejudice. We affirm the court’s order in all other respects.

The Defendant, Marty Lynn Ray, was convicted of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and sentenced to an effective ninety years in confinement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a mistrial after the victim testified about a number of instances of sexual abuse exceeding the nine counts of the indictment; and (2) declining to dismiss a prospective juror for cause based upon her level of English proficiency. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Lakento Smith was indicted on gun and drug charges in 2006. Under the then-applicable sentencing laws, Smith was subject to a mandatory minimum life sentence, which the district court imposed. Congress subsequently lowered the penalty for cocaine-base offenses in the Fair Sentencing Act, made retroactive through the First Step Act. Smith moved for relief under the First Step Act and received a reduced sentence of 360 months, the bottom of the new Guideline range for the two counts impacted by the Fair Sentencing Act. The 360 months were to run concurrent to his existing 360-month sentence for his powder cocaine count that was not affected by the Fair Sentencing Act.

Smith also contends that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court used a modified AO 247 form order to explain its decision. This argument also fails. Even assuming the district court’s obligation to explain its reasons for imposing the modified sentence was akin to that which applies in initial sentencing, the Supreme Court has recently upheld the use of a similar form order in indistinguishable circumstances. We AFFIRM.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Christopher Moody asks this court to unwind his federal convictions. But his habeas claims never should have reached us in the first place. The district court denied Moody’s habeas petition but certified some of his claims for appeal. Because reasonable jurists could not doubt that the district court properly denied relief, we vacate the certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. 

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Lake Building Products, a steel-erection company, challenges the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission’s conclusion that Lake Building violated a regulation requiring certain workers to use equipment protecting them from falls. Although we agree with the Commission’s interpretation of the relevant regulation, we conclude on this record that Lake Building lacked fair notice of that interpretation. We therefore grant the petition.

Petitioner, Mario Hernandez Castillo, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at less than $500, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a new post-conviction hearing based upon the unconstitutional delay in the post-conviction proceedings and the inadequacy of interpreter services. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On December 3, 2018, the Defendant, Juan Dewayne Hall, entered an Alford plea to the offense of possession with intent to deliver over 26 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. As a condition of his plea, the Defendant expressly preserved two certified questions of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, stemming from his denied motion to suppress. After thorough review, we conclude that the certified questions do not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Shane Evans Vincent, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to facilitation of aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years to be served as six months in jail followed by supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of his twelve-year sentence in confinement. The Appellant filed a motion for new trial “on the violation of his probation,” the trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant filed a notice of appeal in this court. The State argues that we should dismiss the appeal because the Appellant’s motion for new trial and notice of appeal were untimely. The Appellant concedes that a probation revocation proceeding is not a “trial”; therefore, his motion for new trial did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. We conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

We granted permission to appeal to clarify the role of prejudice in a court’s determination of whether a plaintiff in a health care liability action substantially complied with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 (Supp. 2019) (“Section 121”) and to clarify the burdens each party bears when seeking to establish, or to challenge, compliance with Section 121. We hold that prejudice is relevant to the determination of whether a plaintiff substantially complied with Section 121, but it is not a separate and independent analytical element. We also hold that a plaintiff bears the initial burden of either attaching documents to her health care liability complaint demonstrating compliance with Section 121 or of alleging facts in the complaint demonstrating extraordinary cause sufficient to excuse any noncompliance with Section 121. A defendant seeking to challenge a plaintiff’s compliance with Section 121 must file a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2012). A defendant’s Rule 12.02(6) motion must include allegations that identify the plaintiff’s noncompliance and explain “the extent and significance of the plaintiff’s errors and omissions and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the plaintiff’s noncompliance.” Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tenn. 2013). One means of satisfying this burden is to allege that a plaintiff’s Section 121(a)(2)(E) medical authorization lacks one or more of the six core elements federal law requires for compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 of the United States Code). Once a defendant files a Rule 12.02 motion that satisfies this prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff either to establish substantial compliance with Section 121—which includes the burden of demonstrating that the noncompliance did not prejudice the defense—or to demonstrate extraordinary cause that excuses any noncompliance. In this case, the defendants met their burden by showing that the plaintiffs’ medical authorizations lacked three of the six core elements federal law requires for HIPAA compliance. This showing shifted the burden to the plaintiffs, and they failed to establish either substantial compliance or extraordinary cause to excuse their noncompliance. As a result of this noncompliance with Section 121(a)(2)(E), the plaintiffs were not entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations. Therefore, their first lawsuit, filed after the one-year statute of limitations expired, was not “commenced within the time limited by a rule or statute of limitation,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a) (2017), so the plaintiffs cannot rely on the one-year savings statute to establish the timeliness of this lawsuit. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ health care liability action as time-barred.

The Appellant, Lavonta Laver Churchwell, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.