In this interlocutory appeal, the employee alleged she suffered an aggravation of a pre-existing mental condition as a result of medication she was taking to treat a compensable work-related physical injury. The employer denied that a compensable aggravation occurred and refused to authorize a referral to a psychiatrist made by the employee’s authorized physician. The employer also failed to authorize a referral to an orthopedic specialist made by the employee’s treating orthopedist. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court determined the employee had come forward with sufficient evidence to show she would likely prevail at trial in establishing her entitlement to benefits. The court ordered the employer to authorize the psychiatrist referral, to authorize the orthopedist referral, to pay temporary disability benefits, and to reimburse the employee’s out-of-pocket medical expenses. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s determinations to order the employer to authorize causally-related treatment with the physicians to whom the employee was referred. We modify the trial court’s order for temporary disability benefits, and we reverse the portion of the court’s order compelling the employer to pay the employee’s out-of-pocket medical expenses. Finally, we find the employee’s argument that the appeal is frivolous to be without merit, and we remand the case.

The employee alleged suffering an electrical shock while working at the employer’s vegetable packaging facility. The employer initially provided workers’ compensation benefits but denied the claim when the authorized physician opined that the employee’s ongoing complaints were causally related to his uncontrolled diabetes rather than the alleged work injury. Following an expedited hearing on the record, the trial court determined the employee had not presented sufficient evidence to establish he would likely prevail at trial and denied the employee’s requested benefits. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that the undisputed facts established that the employee’s injury was not causally related to his employment. The employee has appealed but has failed to identify any issues on appeal, failed to provide any argument to support his position, and failed to explain how he contends the trial court erred. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and certify the trial court’s order granting summary judgment as final.

This is a breach of contract action involving a commercial lease. The plaintiff filed suit for non-payment of rent. The defendant claimed that it was not liable because it provided notice of early termination pursuant to the terms of the contract. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, claiming that notice was not provided within the time set forth in the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

We granted review to determine whether a doctor is qualified to testify in a health care liability case as an expert witness under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 115(b) when the doctor was not licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state within one year of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct, but was practicing under a licensure exemption. Section 29-26-115(b) provides that a doctor is competent to testify as an expert witness only if the doctor is licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state and the doctor was practicing medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the year before the date of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct. We hold that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(b), a doctor, who was permitted to practice medicine in Tennessee under a statutory licensure exemption but was not licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the year before the date of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct, does not meet the requirements of section 29-26-115(b) to testify as an expert witness in a health care liability action. We reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Week of April 13, 2020 - April 17, 2020

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. In this habeas case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, both parties agree that the admission of testimonial hearsay statements during petitioner Joseph Reiner’s murder trial in Michigan state court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers (because the declarant was never available for cross-examination). The Michigan Court of Appeals made that same determination on direct review. The issue on appeal is whether that error was harmless.

A review of the evidence presented at Reiner’s trial paints the picture of a circumstantial case lacking physical evidence or eyewitness testimony placing Reiner at the crime scene. The statements that gave rise to the Sixth Amendment violation here served as the linchpin of the government’s case, connecting Reiner to the fruits of the crime in a way no other evidence, testimonial or physical, could. Without those statements, the prosecution’s case becomes significantly weaker, such that “grave doubt” exists as to whether their admission had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) (citation omitted). We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of Reiner’s § 2254 petition and remand for further proceedings.

Shonique Nechelle Smith, Defendant, appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking community corrections and requiring her to serve the balance of her sentence in incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Stephen Damian Ledet, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for resale and tampering with evidence. On appeal, Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. After review of the record and briefs, we affirm the convictions.

This appeal is from the Claims Commission’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 9-8-402, 29-26-121, and 29-26- 122. We must affirm.

The Petitioner, Jason Matthew Wyatt, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 and summarily dismissing post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues the trial court erred in (1) holding that the Criminal Savings Statute in Code section 39-11-112 did not apply to the amendments to the theft grading statute in Code section 39-14-105 and (2) dismissing his Rule 36.1 motion/post-conviction petition without appointing counsel. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.