In 1985, a Hamblen County jury convicted the Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, of the first degree felony murder of victim Pierce and the first degree premeditated murder of victim Webb. Multiple appeals and remands ensued, following which the Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to two consecutive life terms. In 2017, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court held a hearing and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his motion to reopen should have been granted based on newly discovered evidence, which deprived him of a fair trial, and that he is entitled to coram nobis relief based upon the newly discovered evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Benjamin Scott Brewer, Defendant, was convicted after a jury trial of six counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, driving under the influence, violation of motor carrier regulations, and speeding. As a result, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 55 years in incarceration. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, arguing on appeal that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); that the trial court improperly certified a witness as a drug recognition expert; that the evidence was insufficient to show intoxication; and that the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences. Following our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a trial court may suspend a bonding company for violating a local rule of court requiring an agent of the bonding company to be present at court appearances of defendants for whom the bonding company serves as surety. We conclude that the local rule does not conflict with state statutes and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and that the trial court did not err by suspending the bonding company for violating the local rule. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.

Grants & Denials List

March 30, 2020 - April 3, 2020

Petitioner, Jeremy Cooper, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine in an amount over .5 grams. Petitioner was sentenced to twelve-years’ incarceration to be served concurrently with a ten-year, Madison County, sentence he was already serving. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. After a reviewing the record, we affirm the judgement of the post-conviction court.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. For decades, Honeywell International (Honeywell) and its employees entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) in which Honeywell promised to cover the full cost of its retirees’ health insurance premiums. That changed for certain retirees in 2003, when the parties negotiated a CBA obligating Honeywell to pay “not . . . less than” a specified amount beginning in 2008. This dispute largely turns on the meaning of that revision to Honeywell’s commitment. The retirees argue that: (1) the pre-2003 CBAs vested lifetime, full-premium benefits for all pre-2003 retirees, and (2) the 2003, 2007, and 2011 CBAs vested—at a minimum—lifetime, floor-level benefits for the remaining retirees. Honeywell maintains that none of the CBAs vested lifetime benefits of any kind, and the CBAs’ “not . . . less than” language simply ended the company’s obligation to make full-premium contributions.

In two summary judgment orders, the district court decided that: (1) none of the CBAs vested lifetime benefits; (2) the “not . . . less than” language did not end Honeywell’s obligation to make full-premium contributions until each CBA’s expiration date; and (3) Plaintiffs’ claims that Honeywell had taken certain “windfall” advantages at the expense of retirees were moot. We agree with the district court’s first conclusion, disagree with its second conclusion, and reject Plaintiffs’ windfall claims on the merits. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Petitioner, Roy L. Crawford, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the alleged unlawful detainment related to an escape charge, for which he was not convicted, and to his second degree murder conviction, for which he received a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal concerns a lawsuit between brothers over funds belonging to their late mother, Helen D. Turley (“Decedent”). Tim Turley, executor of Decedent’s estate (“the Estate”), deposited $138,605.14 from a Y-12 Federal Credit Union (“Y-12 FCU”) account owned by Decedent into an estate account at ORNL Federal Credit Union (“ORNL FCU”). An issue arose because William Dean Turley was named sole payableon- death beneficiary on the Y-12 FCU account, and he asserted the funds were his. ORNL FCU filed a complaint for interpleader in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) to determine the funds’ owner. In a cross-claim, Tim Turley and the Estate alleged that William Dean Turley exercised undue influence over Decedent and that Decedent was incompetent when she named William Dean Turley as the payable-on-death beneficiary on the account. William Dean Turley filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Estate and Tim Turley appeal. We hold that William Dean Turley successfully demonstrated that the evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish undue influence, fraud, or lack of mental competency, and there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment, however, to the extent it awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to William Dean Turley, as these fees and expenses were awarded in contravention of the American Rule. Otherwise, we affirm.

This is the second appeal arising from probate proceedings involving the estate of Jesse McCants, Sr. The first appeal concerned the accuracy of the personal representative’s final accounting. The trial court determined that some expenses identified by the personal representative should not be allowed. This Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded “for the entry of a modified order consistent with this Opinion and for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with our direction herein.” The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly followed our instructions on remand. We conclude that the trial court did so; therefore, we affirm.

The plaintiffs filed a health care liability action against a pharmacy and other medical defendants, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants failed to provide proper patient counseling and failed to warn of the risks associated with a prescription drug. The pharmacy defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the gravamen of the complaint against them was a products liability action rather than a health care liability action. The defendants further asserted that the “seller shield” defense found within the Tennessee Products Liability Act provided them with immunity from liability. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that the complaint stated a health care liability action rather than a products liability action. The trial court subsequently granted the defendants’ motion for permission to seek interlocutory appeal regarding whether the seller shield defense contained within the Tennessee Products Liability Act could be asserted when the plaintiffs’ claim is made pursuant to the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. Following our thorough consideration of the issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, determining that the seller shield defense found in the Tennessee Products Liability Act is inapplicable to claims made under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.