The employee, a stagehand union worker responsible for erecting and tearing down spaces for conferences and trade shows, was injured when a cart fell over on him. He received some authorized medical care before the employer denied the claim on the basis of a positive drug screen. The employer also asserted the employee violated a known safety rule. The employee filed a request for expedited hearing, asking the trial court to order the employer to provide additional medical benefits, to pay temporary disability benefits, and to pay attorneys’ fees. Following the expedited hearing, the trial court found the employer had failed to establish either of its affirmative defenses. It ordered the employer to provide additional medical care and temporary disability benefits, but it reserved the issue of attorneys’ fees for a later hearing. The employer has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

The pro se petitioner, Carlos Rice, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County, arguing the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. The petitioner asserts that his sentence has expired and that he is being held past his release date. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court’s dismissal of the petition because the petitioner has failed to show he is entitled to relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Quintin Brittenum, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty-five years’ imprisonment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-504, - 522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant’s sole issue for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support each of his convictions. Upon our review, we affirm.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Christopher Twumasi-Ankrah brings this Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) case against Checkr, Inc., alleging that Checkr’s haphazard reporting of state car-accident data cost him his job as an Uber driver. The district court dismissed Twumasi-Ankrah’s case for failing to comply with what it viewed as the governing legal standard for FCRA cases. But because we conclude that the district court applied a legal standard not in accordance with the statute’s text, and that Twumasi-Ankrah states a plausible claim under the properly construed standard, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Garrett M. Lott was stopped by Kentucky State Trooper Michael King on Interstate-75 for traveling in the left lane without passing other cars. A search of his car turned up heroin and other drugs. Lott was indicted on a single count of possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the district court denied Lott’s motion to suppress the fruits of the vehicle search. At issue on appeal is the district court’s conclusion that (1) the traffic stop was initiated constitutionally, and (2) the stop was not impermissibly extended. We AFFIRM.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Like other cases involving the “state-created-danger” theory of substantive due process, this case comes to us with tragic facts: a fifth grader sexually assaulted a kindergartener. Cf. McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 462 (6th Cir. 2006); Schroder v. City of Fort Thomas, 412 F.3d 724, 725 (6th Cir. 2005). The fifth-grade student, C.T., lit a match during the bus ride home from an Ohio elementary school. In response, school administrators moved him to the front of the bus. While seated in the front, he sexually assaulted the kindergarten student, Minor Doe, as they rode home from school over several weeks. C.T. was expelled and is not a defendant. Instead, Minor Doe’s parents brought a state-created-danger claim against the Jackson Local School District Board of Education and five school employees. The district court granted summary judgment to these defendants, holding that no reasonable jury could find that they knowingly exposed Minor Doe to the risk of sexual assault. We must agree, and respectfully reaffirm that the Constitution does not empower federal judges to remedy every situation we find “heart-wrenching.” Schroder, 412 F.3d at 731.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. In this Fourth Amendment case, Brandon Alexander raises three issues: (1) the admissibility of drug evidence obtained from two vehicle searches; (2) the admissibility of a firearm recovered pursuant to a warrant to search a locked safe found during one of the vehicle searches; and, (3) his classification as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Government concedes that based on United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc), Alexander’s sentence should be vacated, and his case remanded for resentencing without the career-offender enhancement. The remaining issue is whether the two vehicle searches withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny. They do, and we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motions to suppress but do so based on a different rationale. We VACATE Alexander’s sentence and REMAND the case to the district court for resentencing.

The Petitioner, William Lanier, appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury conviction for premeditated first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his two attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the following: (1) original counsel’s investigation and preservation of an alibi witness’s testimony; (2) trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of a third-party defense at trial; (3) trial counsel’s decision to call or not call certain witnesses; (4) trial counsel’s failure to object to false or prejudicial testimony and statements by the State in closing; (5) trial counsel’s failure to impeach a witness’s reason for changing her statement; (6) trial counsel’s failure to request a special jury instruction; (7) trial counsel’s failure to object to testimony about a theft ring and counsel’s eliciting testimony about the same; and (8) original counsel’s failure to argue the motion to dismiss for lack of corpus delicti. The Petitioner also requests a new post-conviction hearing because the post-conviction court failed to make findings of fact related to two of his issues. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Marcellus Hurt, of aggravated assault, vandalism, and domestic assault. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to argue a new theory during rebuttal, (2) the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify regarding the cost of the repairs to his car; (3) the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions of aggravated assault and felony vandalism; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing the Appellant for a Class D felony for the vandalism conviction, by erroneously applying enhancement factors, and by imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we agree that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony regarding the amount of the damages. Therefore, we must reverse the Appellant’s vandalism conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge. The Appellant’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

The Defendant, Markist Kantrell Cole, appeals his convictions for attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by issuing a jury instruction on flight. Following our review, we affirm.