The Petitioner, David Black, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of attempted rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s jury instruction on aggravated sexual battery and failed to argue in his motion for new trial that the instruction was erroneous, trial counsel advised him not to testify at trial, and appellate counsel failed to argue on direct appeal of his convictions that the proof did not meet the elements of aggravated sexual battery. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal of a probate matter, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion occurred as a result of transactions conducted by Appellant as attorney-in-fact of Decedent. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in ruling that a bank account where both Appellant and Decedent signed a signature card was an individual account instead of a joint account with rights of survivorship. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court.

This appeal arises from a hit–and–run involving a tractor-trailer and a passenger vehicle. The plaintiffs—the car driver and passenger—alleged in their complaint that the defendant trucking company owned the tractor-trailer that collided with their vehicle on the interstate. The plaintiffs also served a copy of the complaint on the car owner’s uninsured motorist carrier as an unnamed defendant. Following discovery, the trucking company moved for and was granted summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs were unable to establish liability because they were unable to prove that the trucking company owned the tractor-trailer. The court also dismissed the claims against the uninsured motorist carrier because the plaintiffs failed to establish legal liability against the alleged defendant tortfeasor. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

In this interlocutory appeal, the employee reported back pain after lifting totes at work and sought medical benefits from her employer. After the employee was seen by an on-site nurse and a physician at an urgent care facility, the employer declined to authorize a referral to an orthopedic specialist because the employee was unable to identify a specific date of injury, a specific incident, or a set of incidents allegedly causing her back condition. The employer also asserted the employee failed to provide proper notice of a work injury and failed to show her back condition arose primarily from a work accident. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court ordered the employer to provide the employee a panel of orthopedic specialists, and the employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

Plaintiff John R. Fuller invested more than a million dollars with Jack Brown, who, unbeknownst to Fuller, was running a Ponzi scheme that eventually resulted in Brown’s involuntary bankruptcy and significant losses to numerous investors. Brown had several accounts with Community National Bank (the bank). Brown later died and plaintiff was unsuccessful in recovering from him or his estate. In this action, plaintiff sued the bank, alleging negligence; fraud; aiding and abetting Brown’s fraud and breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty; and violations of Tennessee’s versions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-2-101 (2015) et seq., and Uniform Commercial Code, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-307(b)(2) and 47-3-402(a) (2001). The trial court granted the bank summary judgment. It held plaintiff’s action was barred by the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, based on its finding that plaintiff “was using Brown to launder his ill-gotten gains,” namely, “upwards of one million dollars in cash [plaintiff kept] in safes to avoid paying income tax . . . accumulated from poker machines in his store.” The trial court further held that plaintiff’s UCC claims were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-118(g); that plaintiff “set forth no facts that demonstrate a genuine issue that [the bank] had knowledge of any breach of Brown’s fiduciary duty or had knowledge of such facts that its actions . . . amounted to bad faith”; that plaintiff’s common law claims were displaced by the UCC; that he could not establish an unjust enrichment claim because he did not confer any benefit upon the bank; and that plaintiff failed to establish any damages stemming from the bank’s conduct. We affirm.

Question

Do individuals who are ineligible to vote in Tennessee because of out-of-state felony convictions have to satisfy all outstanding debts arising from court costs, court-ordered restitution, and child support obligations before they are eligible to apply for reinstatement of their voting rights?

Opinion

Yes. Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-202 requires all convicted felons, including individuals convicted in other States or in federal court, to satisfy outstanding debts arising from court costs, court-ordered restitution, and child support obligations before they are eligible to apply for the reinstatement of their voting rights.

Question

Proposed legislation would prohibit homeowners’ associations from amending their declarations to prevent an owner of residential property that is subject to a declaration from using the property as “long-term rental property” until the owner transfers the property. Is the proposed legislation defensible against a challenge that it unconstitutionally impairs the obligations of contracts?

Opinion

Depending on the particular declaration(s) involved in any given case, the proposed legislation is likely defensible against a claim that it violates the Contract Clause of either the federal or Tennessee Constitution.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The twelve cases consolidated in this appeal serve as yet another reminder that it “behooves parties to be meticulous in jurisdictional matters.” Prime Rate Premium Fin. Corp., Inc. v. Larson, 930 F.3d 759, 765 (6th Cir. 2019). “For some 200 years it has been the rule that—no matter the time and resources spent—an appellate court must wipe out everything that has occurred if the lower court lacked jurisdiction.” Id. at 764–65. Here, even though nearly eight years have passed since the plaintiffs sued, all now recognize that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction from the start. We thus vacate the district court’s judgments.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendants AmeriGas Partners, L.P., and AmeriGas Propane, L.P., (collectively, “AmeriGas”) appeal the district court’s order remanding this action to state court. This appeal presents the question of whether a representative action brought by the Michigan Attorney General pursuant to the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.901 et seq., is a removable “class action” under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. For the reasons that follow, we find that it is not and thus affirm the district court’s order. I

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. A criminal conviction must rest only on admissible evidence. Today, we hold that the Government cannot elide this bedrock principle of our justice system by publishing for the jury an unadmitted exhibit under the guise of impeachment.

Because the Government had no legal basis to publish the unadmitted and unauthenticated exhibit to the jury, and because the error was not harmless, we VACATE Craig’s judgment of conviction and REMAND for a new trial.