CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. For the Berge family, federal litigation unfortunately has become something of a family affair. David Berge and his parents, Don and Martha, were named as defendants in an unfair competition lawsuit brought by MarketGraphics Research Group, Inc., a company with which Don had previously been associated. Before MarketGraphics could proceed to judgment, Don and Martha filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. And when MarketGraphics ultimately obtained a judgment against David, he soon began pursuing Chapter 7 proceedings of his own.

We agree with the bankruptcy court. Nothing in the record of these proceedings or the proceedings for the underlying judgment supports a finding that David acted with the requisite intent under § 523(a)(6) to harm MarketGraphics. Nor do we accept MarketGraphics’s contention that we are precluded from reviewing that issue in the first instance. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the bankruptcy court that David’s debts are dischargeable.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Jiries Abu-Joudeh sued police officer Scott Sheets, along with several others, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for breaking into his garage during the repossession of Abu-Joudeh’s vehicle. Abu-Joudeh claims this violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Sheets—the only defendant left on appeal—argued that Abu-Joudeh failed to show that Sheets was the police officer who opened his garage. While the magistrate judge disagreed and recommended that the case proceed to trial, the district court sided with Sheets and granted summary judgment in his favor.

On appeal, Abu-Joudeh moves to supplement the record, asking this Court to take judicial notice of several documents he never submitted to the district court. While we deny Abu-Joudeh’s motion, the record already includes evidence suggesting that Sheets was the officer who broke into his garage. Because this evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact, the district court erred in granting Sheets summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

Jennifer G. (“Mother”) and Brian B. (“Father”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to their minor children, Kayleigh B., Layla B., Isaiah B., and Ja’Nyla B. (collectively, “the Children”). In March 2018, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parents’ rights to the Children in the Blount County Juvenile Court (“Juvenile Court”). Following a hearing in May 2019, the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by wanton disregard, abandonment by failure to support prior to her incarceration, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistent conditions. The Juvenile Court also terminated Father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to support prior to the petition’s filing and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The Juvenile Court further found that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Both Mother and Father timely appealed. We reverse the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support concerning Mother’s parental rights. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects including the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Antwon Young, of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and asserts the State made two improper statements during closing argument. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eric Wooten, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Eugene Spivey, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, Rashari Jones, for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault while acting in concert with two or more persons, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years in confinement followed by four years of supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the defendant regarding his whereabouts preceding the shooting, in finding the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity and omitting the “no duty to retreat” language from the self-defense instruction, and in failing to merge his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. We conclude that although the self-defense instruction was erroneous, the error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, LaDarius Berry, for attempted second degree murder (count 1), aggravated assault (count 2), employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count 3), and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon (count 4). After trial, a jury convicted the defendant as charged in counts 2, 3, and 4 and found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in count 1. The trial court merged the defendant’s convictions in counts 1 and 2 and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentencing imposed by the trial court. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand the case for the specific purposes of entry of amended judgments as to counts 1 and 2 to reflect the non-merger of the offenses as well as the determination by the trial court as to whether the sentences in counts 1 and 2 should be served consecutively or concurrently.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order holding an ex-husband in civil contempt on twelve counts and ordering him to pay $240,507.70 in attorney fees and accounting fees incurred by the ex-wife in this case and a related bankruptcy proceeding. The exhusband appeals. We affirm the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a personal injury case where the trial court entered a directed verdict on liability and where the jury returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff $0 in damages. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for additur. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in not giving the jury an instruction that she was entitled to damages for medical evaluation and diagnostic expenses following her motor vehicle accident and that there is no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict because the unrefuted expert testimony indicated she had suffered an injury and had incurred medical evaluation and diagnostic expenses following the accident. Finding no error by the trial court or with the jury’s verdict, we affirm.