During the pendency of a divorce, Husband was convicted of six counts of criminal contempt for violating the statutory injunction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-106(d). On appeal, Husband contends that the trial court erred in finding that he willfully violated the statute. Because we are unable to determine if the trial court applied an impermissible conclusive presumption to find that Husband was aware of his obligations under the statutory injunction, we vacate and remand to the trial court for reconsideration.

This is a defamation case. Michael Benanti (plaintiff) was convicted of committing multiple felonies, including: armed bank extortion, kidnapping, and carjacking. He is serving four consecutive life sentences at a federal prison in California. Shortly after his incarceration, plaintiff filed a complaint against Jamie Satterfield, the Knoxville News Sentinel, and USA Today (defendants), seeking $3,000,000 in damages. Plaintiff alleged that defendants defamed him by falsely reporting that the FBI suspected plaintiff of committing additional crimes, including murder. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Joseph Marshall asked a district court to terminate his supervised release ahead of schedule. The district court denied the request and Marshall appealed. When we looked at the case the first time, we rejected the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On rehearing, we recognize that we have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and deny the claim on the merits.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Federal law mandates tough sentences for child pornographers—especially those with a history of sexual abuse. James Armes had such a history and received an enhanced sentence as a result. Because the district court got the law right and chose a reasonable sentence, we affirm.

After the defendant, Donald Hyberger, caused a motor vehicle accident, a Davidson County grand jury indicted him for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon (count 1), driving under the influence, third offense (count 2), and driving under the influence, per se, third offense (count 3). The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of a blood draw obtained while he was hospitalized after the accident. After the trial court denied the motion, the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence, per se, third offense but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the motion to suppress the blood draw. Upon our review, we conclude the defendant failed to properly certify the question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

On January 5, 2017, the Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Joshua W. Chambers, for first degree premeditated murder of the victim, Richard Gibeau, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant claimed he killed the victim in self-defense. On May 24, 2018, a jury convicted Defendant of second degree murder. The jury did not reach a verdict on the firearm charge. On November 21, 2017, after the victim was killed but before Defendant’s trial, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued State v. Perrier, holding “that the legislature intended the phrase ‘not engaged in unlawful activity’ in the self-defense statute [Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611] to be a condition of the statutory privilege not to retreat when confronted with unlawful force and that the trial court should make the threshold determination of whether the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity when he used force in an alleged self-defense situation.” 536 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Tenn. 2017). The trial court instructed the jury using Tennessee Pattern Instruction 40.06(b) as it existed before it was amended to comply with Perrier. The instruction given to the jury erroneously required the jury, rather than the trial court, to determine if Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by giving an improper jury instruction on self-defense. The State concedes error in the self-defense instruction but claims the error was harmless. Defendant also claims the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the indictment on the day of trial, by permitting the admission of prejudicial evidence, by denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for a New Trial, and by submitting an incorrect verdict form to the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we find that the trial court committed reversible error by improperly instructing the jury on self-defense. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Larry Braswell, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing the petition, rather than granting relief. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal arises from detainer warrants sought by a decedent’s son seeking to remove a surviving spouse from a house. The trial court granted possession of the property to the son. We find it necessary to vacate the trial court’s ruling and to remand the matter for more in-depth findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by the pro se appellant for failure to state a claim and denied his motion to vacate the dismissal. We affirm.

The defendant, Michael Eugene Rutherford, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated assault, simple possession, driving under the influence (“DUI”), vandalism, and violating the financial responsibility law, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.