This appeal arises out of a negligence lawsuit. TLD Logistics Services, Inc. (“TLD”), an interstate common carrier, sued Pilot Travel Centers, LLC (“Pilot”) in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). TLD was a customer of Comdata Network, Inc. (“Comdata”), and Pilot was a Comdata vendor. Upon request from TLD, Comdata issued codes for the creation of Comcheks, negotiable draft instruments TLD used to pay workers. Pilot would print and deliver the Comcheks. TLD alleged that Pilot breached its duty of care by failing to ascertain whether Comchek payees were legitimate, thus causing TLD monetary loss when a rogue TLD employee fraudulently caused numerous Comcheks to be issued that were negotiated by Pilot. Pilot filed a motion for summary judgment. Pilot argued in its motion that TLD should have kept better internal safeguards to prevent what happened with its employee, and that TLD was 50% or more at fault in this matter. The Trial Court granted Pilot’s motion for summary judgment. Great American Insurance Company (“Great American”), subrogee of TLD and substituted as plaintiff mid-proceedings below, appeals to this Court. We hold that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether TLD was 50% or more at fault. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Amici Curiae Filings:

Marty R. Phillips, Dale Conder, Jr., and Craig P. Sanders, Jackson, Tennessee, and Wendy L. Longmire, and T. William A. Caldwell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Center for Urological Treatment, PLC.

Randall L. Kinnard, Mary Ellen Morris, Jessica J. Kinnard, Donald Capparella, Tyler Chance Yarbro, Kimberly Macdonald, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, Cynthia E. Yebuah and Eric N. Yebuah.

Cary Silverman, Washington, DC, and John M. Kizer, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, Tennessee Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Tennessee Medical Association, American Medical Association, National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, American Tort Reform Association, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., and American Property Casualty Insurance Association.

Braden H. Boucek, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Beacon Center of Tennessee.

Sean W. Martin and Michael J. Petherick, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association.

W. Bryan Smith, Memphis, Tennessee, and Brian G. Brooks, Greenbrier, Arkansas, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association.

Carson A. Royal, Rossville, Georgia, for the amicus curiae, Peter Baldschun.

Philip N. Elbert and Jeffrey A. Zager, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Barbara Patterson.

We accepted certification of the following questions of law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee regarding the constitutionality of Tennessee’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102: “(1) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury, as guaranteed in Article I, section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution?; (2) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate Tennessee’s constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the legislative branch and the judicial branch?; (3) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate the Tennessee Constitution by discriminating disproportionately against women?” Upon review, we answer each of the District Court’s questions in the negative.

Jermain Marvin Alexander, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

Foster parents brought a petition to terminate the parental rights of a biological mother on three grounds, and the trial court granted the petition on all three grounds. Because the foster parents failed to prove any of the grounds by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

Wife appeals the trial court’s judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in treating an obligation contained in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement as an alimony obligation rather than a division of marital debt that was extinguished upon the foreclosure of the subject property. In the alternative, Wife contends that the trial court erred in not further reducing or eliminating her alimony obligation. We conclude that Wife waived her arguments concerning the proper classification of this obligation as a marital debt by not raising this argument in the trial court. As to the trial court’s decision regarding modification of Wife’s alimony, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for an order fully compliant with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

This is an appeal from an order of partial summary judgment. Although the trial court attempted to certify its order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we hold that such certification was improvident. There being no final judgment before us, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The petitioner, James Burgess, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, which petition alleged that his judgments for first degree felony murder are illegal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a marriage of short duration. Following a bench trial, the court granted the wife a divorce and classified and divided the parties’ marital estate. The husband takes issue with the trial court’s classification and division of the marital property, as well as the award of alimony to the wife. The wife seeks attorney fees and costs. We affirm in part as modified and reverse in part.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Hennis Care Centre of Bolivar, Inc., MEGCO Management, Inc., and Hennis Care Centre of Dover, Inc. (collectively, “Hennis”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of Wellfount Corporation’s action. Wellfount filed its complaint in district court after first withdrawing an earlier suit involving the same claims in Indiana state court. Upon hearing from Hennis that the new complaint was likely filed in the wrong forum, Wellfount moved the district court for an order dismissing its action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Hennis, which had yet to file an answer, responded with its own motion asking the court to convert Wellfount’s motion into a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1). The district court denied Hennis’s motion and granted Wellfount’s motion. On appeal, Hennis argues that, because Wellfount was eligible to file a self-effectuating notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) and had previously withdrawn an action based on the same claims, the court was without discretion to dismiss Wellfount’s action under Rule 41(a)(2). We disagree and affirm. I

SILER, Circuit Judge. When Joseph and Melissa Siefert’s child started experiencing suicidal thoughts, anxiety, and depression, they sought help. After first trying medication, they took their teenage child—known here as “Minor Siefert”—to Children’s Hospital just outside of Cincinnati. Eventually, Minor Siefert ended up at a Children’s psychiatry facility, and after about a week, the Sieferts’ insurance company determined that Minor Siefert had no medical problems, so it denied further coverage.

Coverage terminated, the Sieferts decided to bring their child home. But they ran into a problem: doctors and social workers had none of it. Over the next four weeks, the Sieferts wrangled with the hospital and county about getting their child back. Only after the Sieferts signed a voluntary safety plan did the child leave the facility. The Sieferts sued the county and its employees, as well as the hospital and its doctors, alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause’s procedural and substantive components. The district court dismissed the hospital defendants because they were not state actors, and it dismissed the county defendants because it said the Sieferts failed to overcome qualified immunity.

But “[e]ven a temporary deprivation of physical custody requires a hearing within a reasonable time.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dept. of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007). And at litigation’s starting line, the Sieferts only had to plausibly allege a due process violation and that the hospital may be considered a state actor for purposes of this litigation. Today we decide only these narrow questions, and we side with the Sieferts on some and the defendants on others. Whether Defendants ultimately prevail on all claims—at summary judgment or at trial—is best left for another day. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.