NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. There is no dispute that Ohio is generous when it comes to absentee voting—especially when compared to other states. Any registered voter may cast their vote by absentee ballot, for any reason or no reason at all, starting about a month before election day. But there are limits. The State requires almost all registered voters to request an absentee ballot by noon, three days before Election Day. The lone exception is for unexpectedly hospitalized electors. Those electors may request an absentee ballot until 3 p.m. on Election Day.

Following the November 2018 election, Plaintiffs requested class certification and both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court certified the class and granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, holding that the burden Ohio’s disparate treatment of hospital-confined and jail-confined electors places on Plaintiffs’ right to vote is not justified by a strong enough State interest. We disagree and now REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs, REVERSE the district court’s denial of summary judgment to LaRose, and REVERSE the district court’s certification of a class.

PER CURIAM. John W. Franklin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h). The government supports Franklin’s motion.

Question:
Would a law restoring the voting rights of convicted felons who have entered into a payment plan for restitution, child support, and court costs be constitutionally suspect if it also provided for the revocation of those restored voting rights when a convicted felon fails to abide by the terms of the payment plan?

Opinion:
Based on existing precedent from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the legislature may require, as a condition of the restoration of the voting rights of a convicted felon, that the convicted felon enter into a payment plan for satisfying existing financial obligations. And the principles on which that precedent rests suggest that the legislature may restore convicted felons’ voting rights only provisionally, subject to subsequent revocation for failure to pay in accordance with the payment plan. An argument can be made that subsequent revocation for failure to pay need not take indigency to account in order to pass constitutional muster, but no court has directly addressed that question. Nor has any court squarely addressed what procedural protections would be required for a subsequent revocation for failure to abide by the terms of a payment plan. Because those questions remain unresolved, a statutory scheme that (1) explicitly makes the restoration of voting rights provisional and conditional on adherence to the terms of the payment plan, (2) accounts for indigency, and (3) allows convicted felons facing subsequent revocation of restored voting rights for failure to abide by the payment plan to prove their indigency and good faith to a neutral court would be on firmer constitutional footing than a statute that did not include those provisions.

PER CURIAM. Tennessee inmate Christopher Adams filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming, among other allegations, that defendant Dave Baker retaliated against him for his informal grievances about unfair workplace procedures in violation of his First Amendment rights. On January 17, 2018, the district court denied Adams’ request for a preliminary injunction, and Adams filed this interlocutory appeal. We dismiss the appeal as moot. 

The petitioner, Sedrick D. Williams, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, David Darrell Fletcher, of aggravated burglary (count 1), first degree premeditated murder (count 2), and first degree felony murder (count 3), and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus 10 years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his first degree murder conviction and several of the trial court’s rulings. The defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding a statement he made to Amber Fletcher during a recorded phone call, in failing to designate three witnesses as accomplices as a matter of law and in failing to charge the jury accordingly, and in denying the defendant’s motions for a change of venue and for a mistrial. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we note, in merging the defendant’s convictions in counts 2 and 3, the trial court failed to impose a sentence for the merged conviction of count 3. Because the conviction of count 3 carries a mandatory life sentence, a new sentencing hearing is not required, but we remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a completed judgment form as to count 3.

The pro se Petitioner, William Antwain Burns, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory ground of abandonment for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court.

Week of February 24, 2020 - February 28, 2020

PER CURIAM. Charles Furstenau managed the Detroit office of Radiant Global Logistics. When he joined a competitor, Radiant sued him for misappropriation of trade secrets, seeking a preliminary injunction against Furstenau and his new logistics company, BTX Detroit. The district court granted Radiant’s request, enjoining Furstenau and other former Radiant employees from using Radiant’s trade secrets, and from contacting certain customers and carriers for a six-month period. The six-month requirements have come and gone. We dismiss the appeal as moot.