A lessee contended that its right of first refusal to purchase leased real estate was triggered when its lessors transferred the real estate to a general partnership. The lessors disagreed. They contended that the lessee’s right only arose upon receipt of a “bona fide offer from an unrelated third party to purchase” the property and that there was no such offer. The lessee sued the lessors and the general partnership, including its partners and a related individual, seeking specific performance or damages. The trial court dismissed the lessee’s claims on summary judgment. On appeal, we conclude that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

The mother has filed a notice of appeal from an order granting the father’s motion to continue the trial. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss and to compel mediation and arbitration. The Trial Court determined that the plaintiff had properly challenged the mandatory arbitration provisions of the contract, including the delegation clause, on the basis of fraudulent inducement of the contract including the delegation clause. The Trial Court, therefore, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to compel mediation and arbitration. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

We granted permission to appeal to the Defendant, Alexander R. Vance, to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to elicit testimony about a statement made by a non-testifying codefendant whose trial was severed and whose statements were the subject of a motion in limine the trial court had granted. The trial court permitted the testimony after determining that defense counsel had “opened the door” during cross-examination and that the doctrine of curative admissibility permitted the testimony in order to correct a misleading impression created by the cross-examination. The defense objected to the testimony on various grounds. Those grounds did not include constitutional claims under the state and federal confrontation clauses. After the close of proof, the jury convicted the Defendant of one count of second degree murder, an alternative count of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-one years. In his motion for new trial, the Defendant reiterated his arguments against the admission of the “curative” testimony and raised for the first time a contention that the testimony violated his constitutional rights of confrontation. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments. Applying plain error review to the Defendant’s constitutional claims, we hold that, while the trial court erred in admitting the contested testimony, substantial justice does not require that plain error relief be granted. We also hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on the claims he preserved for plenary review. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Following an expedited hearing in which the employee sought additional medical treatment for her work-related injury, the trial court determined the employee had not presented sufficient evidence to establish her entitlement to the requested treatment. The employee has appealed but has failed to file a transcript of the trial court proceedings or a joint statement of the evidence and has not filed a brief. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

Plaintiff filed claims of slander, defamation, and interference with prospective economic advantage against defendant deputy sheriff in his individual capacity. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that he was entitled to immunity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims on the basis of immunity. Because we cannot discern whether the trial court relied on the proper law in its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s judgment.

In this healthcare liability action, the trial court held that the plaintiffs’ sole expert witness was not competent to testify on causation and for that reason granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend, proffering causation testimony from a new expert witness. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to alter or amend. This Court granted permission to appeal. A trial court’s decision on a motion to alter or amend is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; this standard of review does not permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. We hold that the trial court’s decision in this case was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions of the motion to alter or amend and was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. For this reason, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Glenn Fred Glatz, appeals his Sevier County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony into evidence. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, that count is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. We affirm the defendant’s conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

This is the second appeal stemming from the divorce of the parties. After a remand from this Court, the trial court established the amount of alimony in futuro that Wife owed to Husband based on Wife’s ability to pay and Husband’s need for alimony. The trial court also declined to grant a downward deviation in Wife’s child support payments based on her payment of extraordinary educational expenses. The trial court’s ruling was based on a proposed parenting plan never agreed upon by the parties yet referenced by this Court in its initial opinion. We affirm the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro. However, we vacate the trial court’s denial of a downward deviation and remand the decision to the trial court for further consideration.

The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this matter to the trial court for a more definite statement as to the grounds for remittitur. The Court specifically noted that “the trial court’s failure to indicate the reasons for its suggested remittitur leaves us unable to determine whether the evidence preponderates against the remittitur and, consequently, unable to conduct a proper appellate review of the trial court’s remittitur decision.” The trial court responded, inter alia, that the plaintiff had improved his ability to lift and engage in repetitive activities, and that this proof, along with the plaintiff’s success at rehabilitation, strong work ethic, and desire to support his family, led the court to find that the plaintiff “will have some future income over the next 38 years which is the basis for reducing the loss of earning capacity from $1,455,000 to $1,100,000.” We find that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the decision of the trial court to remit the judgment to $1,100,000, and we, therefore reverse the judgment. We further find that based on the proof in the record that the judgment for loss of earning capacity damages should be remitted to $1,334,647. We, therefore, remit the jury’s verdict for loss of earning capacity damages to $1,334,647.