Week of February 10, 2020 - February 14, 2020

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Jonathan A. Wheatley, was convicted of two counts of child abuse and neglect. Subsequently, the trial court ordered a new trial, and the Defendant later pled guilty to one count of child abuse and neglect. As a condition of his guilty plea, he sought to reserve the right to appeal three certified questions of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside his two initial convictions. Following our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to properly certify his questions of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2).

A Tipton County jury convicted the Defendant, Nathan Allen Wallace, of rape, aggravated statutory rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and incest, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) admitted prior statements by the victim into evidence; (2) declined to enforce a subpoena for the victim’s DCS record; (3) admitted expert testimony on the subject of “grooming”; and (4) limited his cross-examination of the victim. The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his request for a suspended sentence should have been granted. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Gustavius Smith, Defendant, admitted to violating the terms of probation and was allowed to enter a six-month program at a rehabilitation facility. After three additional violation of probation warrants were issued alleging Defendant received new criminal charges, and after Defendant was expelled from two rehabilitation programs, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Discerning no error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Casey Carlos Raines, appeals the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2016 convictions of simple possession of methamphetamine and failure to appear, as time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Presley William Nave, Jr., pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and one count of child abuse, a Class D felony, in exchange for a twoyear sentence on probation. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to register as a sex offender. The Defendant appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court gave improper weight to the original offenses charged; and (2) that the trial court did not consider factors weighing against placing the Defendant on the sex offender registry. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Timothy Lindsey, of aggravated rape for a crime committed in 2005, and he was sentenced to serve thirty years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and asserts that the ten-year delay in indicting him violated his right to due process. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and that the Defendant has waived the issue of pre-indictment delay. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed and the case remanded for correction of the judgment form.

This interlocutory appeal involves a claim for death benefits. After filing a petition for benefits identifying the deceased worker and the existence of a dependent spouse, the attorney of record took no further action on the claim. An individual identified as the decedent’s niece later participated in a show cause hearing and requested additional time to file a request for a hearing. That request was granted, and the niece filed a request for an expedited hearing. The employer responded by filing a motion to dismiss, asserting that the niece is not a member of any class of potential dependents under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(c), that the niece is not the legal representative of the decedent’s estate, and that she has no standing to bring a claim for death benefits. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss, determining the motion should be treated as a motion for summary judgment because the employer relied on the niece’s affidavit that was filed in support of the request for an expedited hearing. The employer has appealed. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case.

The Defendant, Raymond Lee Pryor, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his conviction for attempt to commit second degree murder and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Terrence Williams (often referred to as “Terrance Williams” in court documents) was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for his role in a drive-by shooting outside a Detroit nightclub. That verdict and sentence came at the close of an eventful trial—one marked by outbursts, threats toward witnesses, and offensive language—transgressions committed by witnesses, spectators, and counsel alike. After a particularly contentious incident involving a witness and defense counsel, the court took protective action, temporarily closing the courtroom to spectators before reopening it a few days later.

On direct appeal, and now in this habeas proceeding, Williams argues that the temporary closure violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Terry Price, Williams’s trial counsel, failed to object to the closure, however, meaning that Williams defaulted his public trial claim in the state proceeding. And he has not overcome that failure by showing that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective, which might otherwise constitute cause and prejudice excusing the default. We accordingly AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.