KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In February 2018, Quality Associates, Inc. (“QAI”) sued Procter & Gamble Distributing LLC (“P&G”) in Ohio federal court for breaking a contract with it in a racially discriminatory manner. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. But the problem was, P&G had already sued QAI in Ohio state court over the same contractual dispute underlying QAI’s § 1981 claim, and that litigation was still ongoing. So P&G moved to dismiss QAI’s federal suit, arguing that its § 1981 claim was a compulsory counterclaim to the state litigation, see Ohio Civ. R. 13(A), and thus needed to be brought in that proceeding. The district court agreed and accordingly dismissed QAI’s suit. We conclude, however, that a federal court cannot enforce a state compulsory-counterclaim rule against a federal litigant while the relevant state litigation is still pending. For this reason, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Ariel Luna-Romero, a citizen of Argentina, entered the United States illegally. When the government sought to remove him, he applied for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b), withholding of removal, id. § 1231(b)(3)(A), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal from the denial of these applications. We deny his petition for review.

Defendant, Rubalddi Espinoza Yoc, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence and his subsequent resentencing to serve ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Defendant argues that the original violation warrant was invalid because his detention and deportation by immigration authorities was a civil matter rather than a criminal arrest or conviction; that the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing Defendant; and that he should receive sentencing credit until the date that he conceded a violation of community corrections. Based on our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Curtis Taylor, of voluntary manslaughter, attempted first degree murder, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Curtis Taylor, No. W2013-01820- CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4244024 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 7, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2014). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Richard Gleason, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of 12 years’ imprisonment. Defendant raises ten issues in this appeal as of right. Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to provide him a bill of particulars; 2) the trial court erred by not excluding the narrative portion of a medical report admitted as an exhibit; 3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify about a prior consistent statement of the victim; 4) the trial court erred by not permitting evidence of domestic violence between the victim’s mother and the victim’s mother’s boyfriend; 5) the State made improper statements during closing argument; 6) Defendant’s due process rights were violated by a pre-indictment delay; 7) the State’s election of offenses was overly vague and insufficient; 8) the trial court erred by considering non-statutory factors in sentencing Defendant; 9) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and 10) Defendant is entitled to relief for cumulative error. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence statements made by the victim to her mother. The two times hearsay evidence was admitted were through a medical report and also during the mother’s testimony during trial. The statements should have been excluded as hearsay, and it was error for the trial court to allow the statements. We conclude, however, that both errors were harmless and did not affect the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Karlus Montrezz Branch, with first-degree premeditated murder, and he was later convicted of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, and (2) whether the Defendant is entitled to plain error review of the trial court’s admissions of statements made by Tierra Braden as excited utterances, and whether these admissions violated the Confrontation Clause. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. While the case was pending, the trial court ordered the parties to sell commercial property they owned. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court divided the parties’ remaining marital estate. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial court denied her due process by ordering the sale of the commercial property and erred in dividing the marital estate. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, John Anthony Meyer, III, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, in exchange for the dismissal of his remaining indicted counts and an agreed sentence of eleven months twenty-nine days of incarceration. Then Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion to “modify/vacate sentence,” specifically asking the trial court to “vacate the part of his sentence ordering the forfieture [sic] of $8,000.00 because it was not part of his plea agreement.” The trial court correctly ruled that it was without jurisdiction to hear the motion because the motion was filed more than 30 days after the judgment of conviction became final and, in the interim, the Defendant had filed a notice of appeal with this court. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we choose to treat the Defendant’s motion as a timely petition for post-conviction relief, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act. T. C. A. § 40-30-101, et seq.

The Petitioner, William Edward Arnold, Jr., appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction and error coram nobis relief from his convictions for one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. After a careful and laborious review of the entire record, we are compelled to reverse the denial of post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences are reversed and vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial and for any necessary pre-trial motions.

Following an expedited hearing in which the employee sought medical and temporary disability benefits as a result of his workplace injury, the trial court determined the employee was entitled to ongoing medical benefits but not the payment of past medical expenses or temporary disability benefits. The employee has appealed, asserting the trial court erred in declining to award the payment of past medical expenses and refusing to award temporary disability benefits. On appeal, neither party filed a brief addressing any legal arguments with respect to the issues identified in the employee’s notice of appeal. We affirm the trial court’s expedited hearing order and remand the case.