PER CURIAM. More than a decade ago, the Bank of New York began foreclosure proceedings against Greg and Joyce Ackerman. In 2010, an Ohio court entered judgment in the Bank’s favor. Yet since that time, the Ackermans have sought to thwart the foreclosure sale.

In any event, our court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion to reconsider a remand order. See Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 729 F.3d 350, 352–55 (3d Cir. 2013); cf. Christopher v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 240 F.3d 95, 98–99 (1st Cir. 2001) (per curiam). To hold otherwise would “circumvent the jurisdiction-stripping function of § 1447(d).” Agostini, 729 F.3d at 352. While § 1447(d) carves out two exceptions to its general rule (for removal under § 1442 or § 1443), those exceptions have no bearing here. And because we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the Ackermans’ various other motions for relief. See, e.g., In re Champion, 895 F.2d 490, 492 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Shell Oil Co., 820 F.2d 898, 899 (7th Cir. 1987).

The Petitioner’s father, Paul Williams, appeals on behalf of the Petitioner, Elijah Paul Williams, from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm.

In 2016, the Petitioner, Henry Darnell Talley, pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder, reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, being a convicted felon in possession of a weapon, employing a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, and violation of a protective order. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-three years. The Petitioner appealed his sentence as excessive, and this court affirmed. State v. Henry Darnell Talley, No. M2016-01632-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1830100, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017). In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In 2018, the Defendant-Appellant, Whitney S. Phillips, entered a guilty plea to several drug related offenses and received an effective sentence of ten years under the supervision of the Community Corrections Program, after service of eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment. In 2019, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and imposed the original ten-year term of confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion. Upon review, we affirm.

The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this matter to the trial court for a more definite statement as to the grounds for remittitur. The Court specifically noted that “the trial court’s failure to indicate the reasons for its suggested remittitur leaves us unable to determine whether the evidence preponderates against the remittitur and, consequently, unable to conduct a proper appellate review of the trial court’s remittitur decision.” The trial court responded, inter alia, that the plaintiff had improved his ability to lift and engage in repetitive activities, and that this proof, along with the plaintiff’s success at rehabilitation, strong work ethic, and desire to support his family, led the court to find that the plaintiff “will have some future income over the next 38 years which is the basis for reducing the loss of earning capacity from $1,455,000 to $1,100,000.” We find that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the decision of the trial court to remit the judgment to $1,100,000, and we, therefore reverse the judgment. We further find that based on the proof in the record that the judgment for loss of earning capacity damages should be remitted to $1,334,647. We, therefore, remit the jury’s verdict for loss of earning capacity damages to $1,334,647.

The Defendant, Tommy Lynn Rutherford, appeals his convictions for second degree murder and tampering with evidence, for which he received an effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder and that he is entitled to a new trial due to the short amount of time during which the jury deliberated before returning the guilty verdicts. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Ordinarily, a plaintiff can’t have his case and settle it too. Theodore McClain thinks otherwise. McClain settled his case—without reservation. Yet now he wants to represent a putative class action in the same case. Because McClain waived his right to pursue these claims, we affirm.

The defendant, Edward Spencer III, was indicted for one count of aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of both offenses as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender and imposed an eight-year split confinement sentence, with the defendant to serve one year in jail followed by seven years of community corrections. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the sentence of eight years was excessive. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, William K. Lawrence, Jr., was convicted of first-degree murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends: 1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; 2) that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Timothy Harlan; and 3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, William Edward Arnold, Jr., appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction and error coram nobis relief from his convictions for one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. After a careful and laborious review of the entire record, we are compelled to reverse the denial of post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences are reversed and vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial and for any necessary pre-trial motions.