A Chester County jury convicted the defendant, Jessica Lauren Smith, of felony child neglect, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty months in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction and argues the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we conclude there was insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction. However, as there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of attempted felony child neglect, we reverse the judgment for felony child neglect, modify the conviction to attempted felony child neglect, and remand for a new sentencing hearing and entry of an amended judgment.

The Defendant, Roy Brandon, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of possession with intent to sell heroin, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver heroin, a Class B felony; two counts of simple possession of Alprazolam, Class A misdemeanors; and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies, and was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Serenity S., Hezeki S., Azaiah W., and Lyriq S., the minor children (“the Children”) of Angela W. (“Mother”) and William S. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on March 30, 2017, upon investigation into allegations of environmental and educational neglect. The Anderson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) subsequently adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected as to both parents on May 23, 2017. On July 11, 2018, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to the Children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to both parents in an order entered on January 18, 2019.1 As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to visit them, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, (3) the conditions leading to the Children’s removal from Mother’s home persisted, and (4) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

A grocery store, the anchor tenant of a shopping center, objected to the planned construction of a retail auto parts store on an adjacent property, which fronted the shopping center. In letters to the developer, the grocery store claimed it had approval rights in the adjacent property by virtue of its lease. The developer sought declaratory relief to settle the dispute and sought damages against the grocery story under several theories, including slander of title. The grocery store answered and counterclaimed for attorney’s fees. At the conclusion of trial, the court granted the developer its requested declaratory relief, but it dismissed the developer’s claims for damages. The court also declined to award the grocery store attorney’s fees. On appeal, the grocery store claims error in the finding that it lacked approval rights over development of the adjacent property, either by virtue of its lease or equitable theories. The grocery store additionally challenges the denial of its request for attorney’s fees for successfully defending against the developer’s slander of title claim. Based on our review, the grocery store failed to establish it had approval rights over the adjacent property. We also conclude that attorney’s fees were not recoverable for successfully defending the slander of title claim. So we affirm.

This appeal arose from the trial court’s final order denying the father’s motion to set aside a prior agreed parentage order and agreed permanent parenting plan order (“PPP”) entered into by the father and the mother. The trial court determined that under relevant case law, it had “no duty to conduct any further hearing” regarding the parentage order and PPP because the court had on previous occasions conducted multiple hearings. The father subsequently appealed the trial court’s final order, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact regarding the best interest of the minor child. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Johnny Wilkerson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his two convictions for aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate his case, in failing to explain why he could not have a suppression hearing, and in failing to call an alibi witness at trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Dwight Twarn Champion, Defendant, and Lena Virginia Cole, Co-Defendant, for possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in counts one and two; simple possession of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance, in count three; and possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia in count four. After a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to sell in count one, facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in count two, and simple possession of marijuana in count three. The jury was unable to reach a verdict in count four, and a nolle prosequi was entered on that count. The trial court merged counts one and two and, pursuant to an agreement with the State, sentenced Defendant as a Range III career offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with a sixty percent release eligibility for merged counts one and two and to eleven months and twenty-nine days with a seventy-five percent release eligibility for count three, to be served concurrently to counts one and two, for a total effective sentence of twelve years at sixty percent. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial or verdict of acquittal, and the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions and that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

As part of this divorce action, Husband sought enforcement of an antenuptial agreement. Wife claimed the agreement was unenforceable because Husband failed to disclose a condominium he owned with a former girlfriend. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the antenuptial agreement was unenforceable because Husband did not enter the agreement in good faith. We conclude that Husband failed to meet his burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing. So we affirm.

This is an appeal from an order finding the appellant in civil contempt and ordering her incarcerated until she agreed to remove a social media post. The appellant was incarcerated for four hours before she purged herself of contempt by agreeing to remove the post. On appeal, the appellant challenges the civil contempt finding. Because the appellant has purged herself of civil contempt and was released from incarceration, we deem the issue moot and dismiss this appeal.

This appeal involves Appellant City of Memphis’ (“the City”) decision to deny Appellee Pamela Pryor’s application for On-the-Job-Injury (“OJI”) benefits arising from the death of her husband while he was employed as a firefighter. On appeal, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upheld the City’s denial of the OJI claim citing the absence of an autopsy report as required by the City’s OJI policy. On review, the trial court reversed the ALJ’s decision on its finding that the City’s OJI Policy PM 74-02(3), which required claimant to procure an autopsy, conflicted with the statutory presumption given firefighters in Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-201, and remanded the case to the ALJ to conduct a new hearing on the merits. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.