The Defendant, Todd Samuel Adcock, pled guilty to one count of sale of heroin, a class B felony. After entering his guilty plea, the trial court found the Defendant to be a Range III, persistent offender and sentenced him to twenty-five years’ incarceration. The trial court determined that the twenty-five-year sentence was to run consecutively to the Defendant’s previous eight-year sentence from Davidson County.

This case involves statutory interpretation of the requirements for service by private process servers in the General Sessions Courts and whether or not a party has been properly served. Plaintiff obtained default judgments in General Sessions Court against two individuals, a man and a woman, who were living together. Although the process server stated on the return that both parties had been served, only the man had been served.

The Defendant-Appellant, Henry Nicholas Brown, entered a guilty plea in the Roane County Criminal Court to aggravated assault (count one), evading arrest (count two), and reckless endangerment (count three), with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence.1 Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six, four, and two years, respectively. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.

The Appellant, Talmadge D. Murphy, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probationary sentence, specifically arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by considering evidence not elicited by either party during the hearing. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new revocation hearing.

PER CURIAM. Arvis M. Williams, Jr., challenges his guilty pleas on the basis that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. As set forth below, we AFFIRM.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. In this case the district court’s error was one that this court invited. Lawrence Flack argues that the district court erred when it failed to hold a resentencing hearing after, at our direction, the district court vacated one of Flack’s convictions. The reason why the district court did not hold a resentencing hearing, in all likelihood, is that our remand order seemed to suggest that the court did not need to. But on this record that suggestion was mistaken.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Continental Casualty Company filed the complaint in this case fourteen years ago. For over a decade, Continental has litigated over its rights and duties under a liability insurance policy with Indian Head Industries, Inc. Now, on this appeal, the issues have narrowed considerably. However, narrow as they are, the issues are still worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The Defendant, Matt D. Polk, was convicted of one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of the sale less of than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that a video recording was not properly authenticated and that the trial court erred in allowing an expert who had not been disclosed to the defense prior to the day of trial to testify.

The Petitioner, Rodney Raymond Brewer, Jr., appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to Class B felony possession of a schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell in exchange for an agreed-upon Range I sentence of eleven years.

A forklift operator suffered injuries while operating his forklift within the confines of the trailer of a tractor-trailer. He sued the John Doe operator of the tractor-trailer, a trucking company, and a freight broker. Both the trucking company and the freight broker moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions, dismissing the claims against them. On appeal, the forklift operator claims that some of the evidence filed in support of the motions for summary judgment was inadmissible and that there were disputed issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment.