The principal issue in this appeal is whether the 2011 amendments to the Healthcare Liability Act (“HCLA”) extend the statute of limitations in Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) cases. The trial court concluded that the 2011 amendments did not extend the statute of limitations for healthcare liability claims against governmental entities and dismissed all claims against the governmental entities as time-barred. Plaintiff appealed. After this appeal was filed, this court ruled in Harper v. Bradley Cnty., No. E2014-00107- COA-R9-CV, 2014 WL 5487788 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct.

The appellant, Damascus Willingham, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to review and modify his sentences. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Michael Eugene Wallace, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because Petitioner knew of the statute of limitations when he entered his plea and made a strategic decision not to rely on its protection, he did not receive ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the Petitioner, Paul Stackhouse, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction. State v. Paul M. Stackhouse, No. E2010-01972-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 5620925, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 18, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 7, 2012). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the petition.

Defendant, Eric James Miller, appeals his six-year sentence of confinement for theft of property valued over $1,000, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Because the sentencing judge properly considered all sentencing factors and the purposes and principles of the sentencing statutes, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Darryl L. Bryant, was indicted for one count of possession of oxycodone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; and one count of simple possession of marijuana. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, -418. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession of oxycodone with intent to sell, a Class D felony; and acquitted of the simple possession charge. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-403, -17-417. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years as a Range II, multiple offender.

A Williamson County grand jury indicted appellee, Kathy L. Bartlett, for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The charge was dismissed pretrial after the trial court granted appellee?s motion to dismiss. The State appeals the trial court?s granting of the motion and argues that the trial court misapplied the law relating to lost or destroyed evidence. Following a thorough review of the record, we reverse the ruling of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The issue in this case is whether former foster parents have standing to bring an action for termination of parental rights and adoption of children formerly in their care. We hold, as did the trial court, that former foster parents do not have standing to do so.

The case concerns the imposition of sales and use tax on a luxury motor home stored in Tennessee by an out-of-state corporation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the tax-payer corporation, finding that the imposition of sales tax was not authorized by statute and was not consistent with the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. We reverse and remand.

Husband in divorce action appeals trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony in futuro to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s division of marital property; we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand to the trial court for reconsideration.