The Petitioner, Darien C. Houston, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief for having been untimely filed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Daniel David Eden, appeals as of right from the Robertson County Circuit Court?s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. The Petitioner contends that Young v. State, 101 S.W.3d 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002), on which the post-conviction court relied in its summary dismissal, should be abrogated because it offends equal protection guarantees. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Derek Gene Clark, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to aggravated domestic assault, a Class C felony; theft of property valued more than $1,000, a Class D felony; coercion of a witness, a Class D felony; and retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences except that the appellant was to serve the sentences for the aggravated domestic assault and theft convictions concurrently.

This appeal involves the interpretation of an insurance policy in order to determine whether the policy provided coverage for damage caused by arson. The insurer and the insured filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on this issue. The trial court found the policy ambiguous and construed it in favor of coverage, holding that arson was covered under the policy. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the insured and denied the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the insurer. The insurer appeals. We affirm.

In this juvenile court proceeding, Father objects to a number of decisions made by the trial court concerning the parenting plan for the parties? child. We have determined that the trial court erred in its determinations regarding parenting time and child support. As to the latter, the trial court failed to consider Father?s argument that Mother was underemployed, abused its discretion in its treatment of Mother?s work-related child care expenses, and failed to properly calculate Father?s income. We find no merit in any of the other issues raised by Father.

Defendant, Cody Lee Crawford, challenges the trial court’s decision ordering him to register as a sex offender after he pled guilty to two counts of statutory rape. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The trial court terminated Father?s parental rights on the statutory ground of wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Father appealed. We reverse because when Father engaged in the conduct at issue, in fact, Father did not know of his parentage. A father cannot exercise wanton disregard for the welfare of a child if he does not know the child exists.

The defendant, Eric O. Turner, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a persistent offender to nine years for each conviction, with one conviction to be served consecutively to the others for an effective sentence of eighteen years. After pleading guilty, the defendant was immediately released on probation.