This is a will contest case. The Decedent executed a will in 2006 and a codicil to the will in 2012. The will specifically disinherited the Appellant, and the codicil removed one of the Decedent?s children as co-executor of the estate. Appellant contested the will, arguing both that the Decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute either the will or the codicil and that the will was executed under undue influence.

Petitioner, Sylvia Laird, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. She claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when she was erroneously informed that she could not file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea before sentencing. Consequently, Petitioner argues that a subsequent guilty plea agreement that determined her sentence was unconstitutional because it was entered unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently.

The parties were married for less than two years, and they had one child together who was three years old at the time of the divorce. Shortly after the child’s birth, Mother moved with the child to New York to be near her family. The trial court named Mother the primary residential parent, ordered Father to pay $697 a month in child support, awarded Father one weekend a month of visitation, and ordered Mother responsible for the transportation costs of the child to visit Father, including the cost of an additional ticket for a parent or guardian to fly with the three-year-old child.

This appeal involves a child support order entered after an international adoption. The trial court found that the child?s adoptive mother failed to pay child support as previously ordered by the court, and therefore, the mother was adjudged in contempt. On appeal, the mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the previous order requiring her to pay child support and also lacked jurisdiction to hold her in contempt of that order. Alternatively, she argues that she did not willfully violate the court?s order.

In this termination of parental rights case, Mother appeals the trial court?s findings of abandonment by willful failure to support and the persistence of conditions as grounds for termination. Mother also appeals the trial court?s conclusion that termination was in the child?s best interest. Pre-adoptive parents appeal the trial court?s decision declining to find the ground of willful failure to visit. We affirm the trial court?s findings of willful failure to support and persistent conditions.

This is Plaintiff?s second appeal of the dismissal of his legal malpractice claim. The first appeal arose from the grant of a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) wherein the trial court concluded that Plaintiff?s cause of action accrued more than one year before the complaint was filed and was time barred. Based solely on a review of the allegations in the complaint, we concluded that the action was not time barred. See Davidson v. Baydoun, No. M2008-02746-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2365563 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2009).

Appellant tripped and fell on a concrete landing in a parking lot. At the time, Appellant was attempting to return to his vehicle, which was located in the parking lot of a separate retail establishment. Appellant suffered injuries from his fall and sued the parking lot owner for negligence. The parking lot owner moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in the owner?s favor, finding that the owner did not owe a duty to Appellant. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Harry Joseph Chase, appeals as of right from the Greene County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because lead trial counsel was not present when he pled guilty, did not review the Petitioner’s discovery with him, and did not fully discuss a possible self-defense claim with the Petitioner.

The appellant, Deborah B. Bowes, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to one count of filing a false report, for which she received a sentence of eight years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.