This is an interlocutory appeal of the Tennessee Claims Commission?s denial of Appellant State of Tennessee?s motion to dismiss the Appellees? appeal of the denial of her tort claim by the Division of Claims Administration. Appellee filed her notice of appeal with the Commission 91 days after notice of the denial of her claim.

The trial court entered an order establishing paternity and setting child support for a non-marital child. The trial court also granted J. W. B.’ s (hereinafter “Father”)1 oral motion to change the child’s surname from T. H.’ s (hereinafter “Mother”) to Father’s. Mother appeals only the order changing the child’s surname. We reverse.

This is a post-divorce case. The parties executed a marital dissolution agreement, and the trial court incorporated the agreement into the divorce decree. Several years after the divorce, Appellee received a substantial social security disability payment that was deposited into a bank account held jointly with Appellant. Appellant later withdrew approximately one-half of the deposited amount. In response, Appellee took a vehicle that was awarded to Appellant under terms of the marital dissolution agreement.

After foreclosing on three lots securing three loans, the mortgagee, Heritage Bank, sought to satisfy the outstanding deficiency by foreclosing on the debtors? family-owned property that additionally secured these obligations. To prevent the impending foreclosure, the debtors commenced this action contending they are not liable for the deficiency because the properties sold at foreclosure for an amount materially less than their fair market value. In its answer, the bank asserted a counterclaim seeking a deficiency judgment and attorneys? fees.

This is an appeal from the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment to Appellees on their Open Meetings Act claim, and the grant of partial summary judgment to Appellees on their Fair Housing Act claims, i.e., disparate treatment and disparate impact. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Open Meetings Act claim. We further conclude that there are disputes of material fact that preclude the grant of partial summary judgment on the FHA claims.

This appeal involves the termination of Mother’s parental rights to her child. At ten and one-half weeks old, the Department of Children’s Services placed the child with guardians due to Mother’s drug use. About eighteen months after the child’s placement with the guardians, the Guardian ad Litem filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The juvenile court found statutory grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest.

The matters in dispute pertain to four promissory notes. After the Bank filed suit to collect on the notes, Defendants filed counterclaims against the Bank and cross-claims against one of its agents. Following discovery, the Bank and its agent moved for summary judgment on all claims; Defendants opposed summary judgment on several grounds.

The Defendant, Melvin Brown, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”); DUI with blood alcohol more than .20%; violation of the implied consent law; reckless driving; and driving with a license revoked, suspended, or cancelled. The Defendant refused law enforcement’s request to submit to a blood test to determine his blood alcohol content, and his blood was taken, without a warrant and over his objections, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(1) (Supp. 2011).

A jury convicted the defendant, Travontay Tremont Berry, of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant appeals the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony conviction, arguing that he did not know that an investigation was pending at the time of the offense. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Claudale Renaldo Armstrong, of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine base; delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine base; sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine; and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2011). The trial court merged the four alternative counts into two convictions and sentenced Armstrong as a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Department of Correction.