Rickey Bell (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of forty-nine years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars and in allowing proof of certain prior bad acts. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for rape of a child and rape.

This is a legal malpractice case that was dismissed on grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee law firm. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, and also struck Appellant’s filings in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as untimely. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This is the second appeal in this action involving a dispute over setoff claims related to a bankruptcy proceeding. The action commenced when the original plaintiff, Delwin L. Huggins, filed a complaint against the defendants, R. Ellsworth McKee and Alternative Fuels, LLC (“AF”), in December 2007. In July 2009, Mr. Huggins filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In that proceeding, John P. Konvalinka purchased Mr. Huggins?s interest in this action and was subsequently joined as a substitute plaintiff.

Defendant, Rubalddi Espinoza Yoc, was convicted by a jury of one count of possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance and one count of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court merged the two counts and sentenced Defendant to nine years? incarceration as a Range I, standard offender, with all but one year suspended on probation. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Based upon our review of the record and legal authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffrey Scott Tucker, was convicted after a jury trial of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; assault of a law enforcement officer, a Class A misdemeanor; domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the domestic assault conviction, contending that the testimony did not establish that the victim was in fear. The simple assault conviction, which the parties agreed would merge with the domestic assault conviction, was dismissed by the trial court after the jury returned a verdict.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Petitioner, William A. Osborne, of three counts of facilitation of aggravated burglary, one count of facilitation of theft of property valued more than $500, one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, and one count of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender and ordered the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of thirty-six years. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. William A. Osborne, No.

Petitioner, Marques Johnson, entered into a plea agreement in two separate cases. In the first case, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle and one count of theft of property valued over $500 and was sentenced to an effective sentence of six years. In the second case, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle and one count of theft of property valued over $1,000 and was sentenced to an effective sentence of twelve years.

A jury convicted the defendant, Willard V. Fleming, of facilitation of the sale of cocaine, a Class D felony; facilitation of keeping or maintaining a dwelling used for keeping or selling controlled substances, a Class E felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor.

This is an appeal by Williamson County Bail Bondsman, Amir Karshenas of American Bonding Company, of the trial court’s denial of his motion to recuse the judge from hearing matters related to his authority to conduct business as a bail bondsman. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the motion to recuse.

This post-divorce dispute concerns a divorce decree that required husband to pay one-half of his retirement benefits to wife as alimony in solido. Fourteen years after the divorce, Husband returned to the trial court to terminate the payments on the ground that by the terms of the divorce decree, husband had been substantially overpaying wife. The trial court denied husband’s petition on the alternative grounds of res judicata, and a finding that the divorce decree obligated husband to pay wife one-half of the entire value of the retirement plan.