The ultimate issue in this lawsuit is how much of the electric and gas tax equivalent payments made by MLGW to the City of Memphis must be shared with Shelby County. The City claimed that it overpaid Shelby County in electric tax equivalents in recent years, while Shelby County claimed that it was underpaid in gas tax equivalents. The trial court found that the City paid the correct amount of electric tax equivalent payments for the years in question and rejected the City’s claim for damages for alleged overpayment.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The court-appointed Guardian ad Litem (“the Guardian”) for the minor child Jonathan F. (“the Child”) filed a petition 1 in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Amy F. (“Mother”) and Uriah F. (“Father”) to the Child. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a response joining in the Guardian’s petition. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on a host of grounds. We vacate certain of the grounds as relates to Father.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion to Recuse filed during post-judgment proceedings in a case involving a dispute over the validity of a check written against the revocable living trust of the decedent. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by the Defendant/Appellant, Charles Glen Johnston (“Defendant”), pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The Trial Court Judge announced a ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the final hearing below and then subsequently entered a written order vacating the oral ruling. The order vacating the oral ruling contemplates further proceedings in the Trial Court in that it allows for the filing of an Amended Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. Because there is no final written order terminating the parental rights of the appellant, Hearkner L., to her children, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jameca M. Tipler, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and felony vandalism. The jury convicted Tipler of all the charged offenses except the felony vandalism charge, which the jury determined was a misdemeanor. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction with the attempted first degree murder conviction and sentenced Tipler to an effective sentence of twenty-five years.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Antonio Bagwell, of two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault while acting in concert with two or more other persons, a Class B felony; and one count of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received concurrent sentences of ten years for each Class B felony conviction and five years for the Class C felony conviction for a total effective sentence of ten years.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the transfer of Marcia Hull’s monetary assets and jointly-held property to the Culver Estate. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Richard Blanchard, was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an eleven-year sentence. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Richard Lowell Blanchard, No. M2010-1186-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2533753, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 24, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 12, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief.

The defendant, who was indicted for child neglect based upon her failure to obtain medical treatment for her daughter, challenged the constitutionality of the “spiritual treatment” exemption within the child abuse and neglect statute.