Maston G. Lyons, III and Linda C. Lyons (“Plaintiffs”) sued attorney Fielding H. Atchley, Jr. (“Defendant”) alleging, in part, that Defendant had breached a duty that “cost the Plaintiffs their fair and complete hearing in Lyons v. Leffew et al.,” and that the alleged breach had “costs [sic] the Plaintiffs their fiduciary interest in said case.” Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing on the parties’ motions, the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) granted Defendant summary judgment.

This is a healthcare liability action. The trial court granted Defendants’ joint motion for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(f)(1), but added several conditions not specifically provided in the statute. The trial court denied Defendants’ joint motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal, and we granted Defendants’ motion for an extraordinary appeal to this Court under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Kayln Marie Polochak, was convicted by an Overton County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and theft, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-103, 39-13-403, 39-14-103 (2014). The trial court merged the first degree and felony murder convictions and imposed a life sentence.

The Petitioner, Frazier Perry, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Leniel Middlebrooks, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -13-103, -17-1307. Prior to trial, the State dismissed one of the counts of aggravated assault. Following a bifurcated jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of aggravated assault and facilitation of reckless endangerment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403.

The Defendant, Roger Wayne Henry, Jr., was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years and six months at 100% service.

Petitioner, Teresa Deion Smith Harris, appeals the denial of her petition for writ of error coram nobis. In the circuit court, petitioner raised a claim of newly discovered evidence relating to the timing of the victim’s death and the degree of torture that he endured. The coram nobis court summarily denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Petitioner, Antonio D. Alexander, was convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon and sentenced to a total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus 90 years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Antonio D. Alexander, No. M2010-02485-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1895801, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2012).

We granted the State of Tennessee permission to appeal in this criminal proceeding to address two issues: (1) the analytical framework that a successor judge should utilize in deciding whether he can act as the thirteenth juror, and (2) the standard of appellate review of a successor judge’s determination that he can or cannot act as the thirteenth juror. We hold that there is a rebuttable presumption that a successor judge can act as the thirteenth juror. We also hold that an appellate court should review de novo a successor judge’s decision about acting as the thirteenth juror.

The Appellant, James Richardson Reece, appeals the judgment of acquittal of aggravated assault and the trial judge’s findings of contempt of court. The appeal of the judgment of acquittal is hereby dismissed and the findings of contempt are affirmed.