The Petitioner, Jefferson Lawton Freeman, appeals as of right from the Henry County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Devonta Amar Cunningham, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective life sentence. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. On the same day, he filed a motion for new trial and for judgment of acquittal. The petition and the motion were denied by the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Clark, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for procedural defects and for failing to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Employee of a contractor of alarm systems applied to be registered with the Alarm Systems Contractors Board. When his application was denied, the employee filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the Board’s decision; on the Board’s motion, the trial court dismissed the petition pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Finding that the petition alleges sufficient facts to establish a right to certiorari review, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Derek Horne, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of the latter. We affirm the convictions but remand for correction of clerical errors in one of the judgments.

Defendant appeals a judgment holding that he ran a stop sign, contending that the court did not have subject matter or in personam jurisdiction over the matter, and that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County lacked standing to bring the action. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dylan M. Yacks, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), see T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (1) (2012), in exchange for a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended after service of two days confinement. As a condition of his guilty plea, the Defendant-Appellant properly reserved a certified question of law challenging the constitutionality of the stop and subsequent arrest. Upon our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Cecilia Williams, was convicted of three counts of assault and one count of resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of 11 months and 29 days for each of the assaults and to a consecutive sentence of six months for resisting arrest. The court ordered split confinement for a period of six months and suspended the remainder of the Defendant’s sentence to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions.

Alexa Williams a.k.a. Elizabeth Williams El (“the Appellant”) was convicted by a jury of ten traffic offenses. In this direct appeal, the Appellant contends: (1) the judgments of conviction are not valid because bail was excessive; (2) the trial court improperly refused to allow the Appellant to have “counsel of her choice”; and (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we find the issues without merit and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, David Dewayne Smith, was indicted along with three other individuals for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Before trial, the State entered a nolle prosqeui as to the charges against one co-defendant and entered into a plea agreement with another. The trial proceeded against the Petitioner and the remaining codefendant. On the third day of trial, the State announced that it had entered into a plea agreement with the remaining co-defendant, and the co-defendant would testify against the Petitioner.