The petitioner, Sean William Lee, pled guilty in 2004 to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to three years, which then was suspended to six years probation. In 2013, after a probation violation warrant was filed against him, he filed a pleading styled “Motion to Revoke Probation and Impose a Sentence in Absentia.” He followed this pleading by filing a petition for writ of error coram nobis, based upon what he saw as newly discovered evidence.

The Petitioner, William Carter King, appeals the Fentress County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2011 guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution and his five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Leon Flannel, was convicted of murder in the perpetration of a theft and premeditated murder. In this appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, the Petitioner argues that the individual tests performed by the defense’s expert witness, along with their results, should have been introduced at trial to bolster the Petitioner’s diminished capacity defense. Upon review, we find that the petition for writ of error coram nobis is barred by the statute of limitations.

The appellant, Carlos Eaton, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1995 guilty plea to first degree murder and his life sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Williamson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Karl P. Cooper, of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense; speeding; and violating the open container law. The appellant received a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days and was ordered to spend sixty days of the sentence in jail before being released on probation.

The Petitioner, Michael Brandon Adams, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his motion without appointing counsel and without conducting an evidentiary hearing. In his motion, the Petitioner asserts that his sentence is illegal on the grounds that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.

This Court entered an order in September of 2014 directing ELM Children’s Educational Trust (“the Trust”) to show good cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Notice of Appeal was signed by a non-attorney, non-party. The Trust failed to show good cause. We hold that a non-attorney trustee may not represent a purportedly pro se trust. As such, the Notice of Appeal signed by the non-attorney trustee was insufficient to initiate an appeal on behalf of the Trust. This appeal, therefore, is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant, Antonio Gale, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated rape. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser-included offenses of rape in Count One and assault in Count Two. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Defendant to eleven years at 100% for the rape conviction.

This is a divorce case in which Appellant/Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for alimony and reimbursement of her medical bills. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights contending the evidence was insufficient to prove any ground or that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate her parental rights. The trial court found that the petitioners, the father and step-mother, proved two grounds of abandonment, failure to support and failure to visit the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), and that termination of Mother’s rights was in the best interest of the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(c)(2) and (i).