The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Anderson County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to have the minor child Jocelyn L. (“the Child”) found dependent and neglected. The Child’s father, James L. (“Father”), was alleged to have sexually abused the Child. The Juvenile Court entered a restraining order against Father. While both Father and the Child’s mother, Amanda L. (“Mother”), were named respondents in DCS’s petition, Mother was named only so as to require her to uphold the restraining order against Father.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Chelsia J. and Jared J., the minor children (“Children”) of Fleesha J. (“Mother”) and Mark F. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on April 28, 2011, upon investigation of the Children’s exposure to controlled substances in the parents’ home. On March 21, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents.

In this action for conversion of personal property, Plaintiff contends the defendant, the Nashville Rescue Mission, is liable for throwing away his personal possessions that he stored in a locker at the Mission. Relying on the terms and conditions of a written “Locker Use Guidelines and Agreement,” the Mission insists it is not liable because it disposed of the property as authorized by Plaintiff. The Mission submitted interrogatories and requests for admissions to which Plaintiff objected generally.

The Petitioner, Michael Deshawn Smith, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to include a transcript of the plea submission hearing in the record on direct appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Shairiq Seabrooks, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to confinement for twenty-two years. His conviction was affirmed by this court, and our supreme court denied his application for permission to appeal. State v. Shairiq Seabrooks, No. W2008-00443-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103792, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 15, 2010). Thereafter, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

John Brunner (“the Petitioner”) was indicted for first degree murder and domestic assault. After a trial, a jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and domestic assault. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Reginald Dewayne Tumlin, of two counts of child abuse, one count of criminally negligent homicide, and one count of aggravated child neglect. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Christopher Jake Reynolds, has appealed the Giles County Circuit Court order dismissing his third petition for post-conviction relief in which Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations.

Father’s parental rights to his three children were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, failure to support, and failure to provide a suitable home, as well as persistence of the conditions that led to the removal of the children. He appeals, contending that there is not clear and convincing evidence sufficient to terminate his parental rights. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.