Following a remand from this court, the petitioner, William L. Vaughn, acting pro se, was permitted a second evidentiary hearing on certain ineffective assistance of counsel claims which he had not presented in the first hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. As we will set out, he filed massive pleadings, complaining of a multitude of wrongs visited upon him, from the moment of his arrest through his direct appeal.

A Robertson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Gabriel Torres, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court failed to fulfill its role as the thirteenth juror. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Billy D. Sizemore, was convicted of theft over $1,000 and sentenced to twelve years as a career offender. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to challenge the value of the stolen goods and (2) failed to seek a continuance after the State filed a late notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment.

A Robertson County Grand Jury indicted appellee for possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. The charges were dismissed after the trial court granted appellee’s motion to suppress evidence. The State appeals the trial court’s granting of the motion to suppress and argues that appellee’s arrest and search were proper. Following a thorough review of the record, we reverse the ruling of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The pro se petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, per Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we find the petitioner’s motion stated a colorable Rule 36.1 claim for review of illegal sentences. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's summary dismissal and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal stems from a divorce proceeding and child support modification. On appeal, the appellant husband challenges several decisions made by the trial court after it had entered an order purporting to be the final decree of divorce. Because prior orders reserved issues not addressed in this divorce decree, we find this divorce decree was not a final order, and thus, subject to revision by later orders.

An employee alleged he injured his back on two occasions during late 2008. His employer initially accepted the second claim as compensable, but then denied the claim after receiving records from the employee’s primary care physician. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied the employee’s Request for Assistance. This civil action was subsequently filed in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County. That court awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the employee.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee filed a request for reconsideration pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(B), which Employer opposed on the ground that Employee’s loss of employment was due to Employee’s voluntary resignation and/or his employment-related misconduct.

The defendant, Somer D. Wild, was indicted for driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. After the trial court denied her motion to suppress the legality of the traffic stop, the defendant pled guilty to the offense and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended following the service of forty-eight hours in jail. As part of her plea of guilty, the defendant reserved as a certified question of law the legality of the traffic stop of her vehicle.

The defendant appeals the sentence imposed for conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.