The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Harris, was indicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court Grand Jury for six counts of attempted second degree murder and one count of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Harris was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder (count two), five counts of misdemeanor reckless endangerment (counts one, three, four, five, and six), and one count of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count seven).

The pro se petitioner, Charles Orlando Fields, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his second pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the summary dismissal of the petition was proper and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Quincey Bernard Dotson, was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced to a term of ten years as a Range II offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s failure to apply any mitigating factors in determining his sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Glenn Collins, Jr., appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Kevin Cortez Chrystak, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order affirming his conviction for violation of the implied consent statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406. In the trial court, the Defendant raised a statutory interpretation argument concerning the mandatory blood draw provision of the implied consent law. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the mandatory provision is unconstitutional, violating his Fourth Amendment Rights, and that he did not violate the implied consent law when he presented for the mandatory blood draw.

Appellant stands convicted of possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, a Class A felony, and possession with intent to sell 0.5 ounce or more of marijuana in a drug-free school zone, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years for his cocaine conviction and twelve years for his marijuana conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions.

The federally-incarcerated Petitioner, Marcus Boales, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Henderson County Circuit Court, seeking relief from his two 1996 drug convictions that were used to enhance his federal sentence. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal concerns a garnishment. Newgate Recovery, LLC (“Newgate”) brought a garnishment action in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”) against Manreet Singh (“Singh”) through Singh’s former employer R & R Group, Inc., d/b/a The Deerfield Inn (“Garnishee”). After Garnishee failed to respond to the garnishment, the Trial Court entered judgment against Garnishee in the amount of $1,283,066. Garnishee moved for relief from the judgment on the basis of insufficient service. The Trial Court granted Garnishee’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.

This post-divorce matter presents the primary issue of whether the trial court properly calculated, for child support purposes, the obligor parent’s income from self-employment. The trial court held that mortgage payments made by the obligor’s business with respect to a commercial building solely owned by the obligor should not be added to the obligor’s other income for the purpose of calculating child support. The obligee parent appeals that ruling to this Court. We affirm on that issue, concluding that such payments were already included in the obligor parent’s income calculation.