This appeal involves the classification and division of Husband’s $66,000.00 personal injury settlement in a divorce proceeding. The trial court classified the settlement as marital property, it deducted $13,400.00 for what it found to be “legitimate expense[s] of the marriage” paid by Husband, and it awarded Wife one-half of the balance, or $26,300.00. We reverse the trial court’s award to Wife.

The trial court determined that no material and substantial change in circumstance had occurred and denied Father’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan. We affirm.

This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation. Father sought to relocate to Arizona, citing family ties and increased career opportunities. The parties agreed that Father spent substantially more time with the child than Mother; however, Mother objected to the relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose. The trial court agreed with Mother and entered a parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent.

The defendant, Armard Reeves, was convicted of one count of unlawful and knowing possession with intent to deliver three hundred pounds (300 lbs) (136,050 grams) or more of a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant was arrested as a part of a larger investigation that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) were conducting into narcotics distribution.

The petitioner, David Lynn Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and is currently serving a sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was error because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately prepare the petitioner to testify at trial; and (2) failing to investigate and interview an alibi witness.

Appellee, Jerry R. Shouse, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury with one count of driving under the influence and one count of violation of the open container law. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the warrantless seizure was arbitrary and oppressive. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress by written order. The State filed a notice of appeal on the same day that the order of nolle prosequi was entered.

The defendant, Joseph Samuel Kyle, was convicted by a Benton County Circuit Court jury of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after serving thirty days in jail. On appeal, he argues: (1) interrelated issues that the trial court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony into evidence over his objection.

The petitioner, Ernest Lee Jennings, III, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in admitting at trial evidence seized from his room. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jason Osmond Hines, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief for his conviction of second-degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to properly impeach the State’s witnesses and adequately present a theory of self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.